Mandatory savings, information and welfare : theory and empirical evidence by Cuevas, Conrado
 warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/108842  
 
Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Mandatory savings, information and welfare
Theory and empirical evidence
Conrado Cuevas Lo´pez
A thesis presented for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Department of Economics
University of Warwick
September 2017
Contents
1 The Pied Piper of Pensioners 8
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.1.1 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.1.2 The Chilean social security system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.2 H&L’s impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2.1 Portfolio transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2.2 Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.2.3 Do followers gain? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.2.4 Characterizing followers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
References 40
Appendices 43
1.A Survey questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.B EPS and survey samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.C Modified Sharpe ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2 The social value of information in economies with mandatory sav-
ings 47
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.2.1 Financial markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.2.2 Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.3 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4 Changes in information and welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.5 Ex-post improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.6 Ex-ante improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.6.1 Non-concavity of the Pareto frontier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.6.2 Sufficient conditions for an ex-ante improvement . . . . . . . . 66
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
References 73
Appendices 75
2.A Proof of Proposition 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.B Proof of Proposition 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.C Proof of Proposition 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.D Proof of Corollary 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.E Proof of Proposition 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.F Proof of Proposition 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
1
2.G Proof of Theorem 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.H Properties of the equilibrium gross interest rate . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.I Proof of Proposition 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.J Proof of Theorem 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Bibliography 93
2
List of Figures
1.1 H&L recommendations and daily net flows to portfolios A and E. . . 17
1.2 Investors interest, media coverage, and new subscriptions. . . . . . . . 18
1.3 Trading volume of IPSA and H&L’s announcements . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.4 Membership length according to payment records. . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.5 Twelve month returns during survey period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.6 Why do current followers follow H&L? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.1 Ex-ante and Ex-post constrained Pareto improvements. . . . . . . . . 59
2.2 Indifference curves at the equilibrium allocation. . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.3 Indifference curves at the uninformative equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.4 f and its concavification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.5 Indifference curves at  = 0. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3
List of Tables
1.1 Total assets of each portfolio and asset distribution on 12/31/2014. . 15
1.2 Real annual returns across AFPs: 27 Sept 2002-Aug 2015 . . . . . . . 15
1.3 Type of followers and their savings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4 Net flows to portfolios around new recommendation days. . . . . . . . 19
1.5 Relative net flow to portfolio E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.6 Recommendations and portfolio transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.7 Past performance and cash flow to portfolios A and E . . . . . . . . . 24
1.8 Recommendations and asset returns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.9 Cumulative returns of the ACWI and VIX indexes. . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.10 Trading volume around new recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.11 Recommendations and asset returns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.12 Percentage of followers that beat a Buy & Hold strategy. . . . . . . . 32
1.13 Nominal cumulative return for H&L’s strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.14 Demographics from our survey and the 2015 EPS. . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.15 Answers to questions related to financial sophistication. . . . . . . . . 36
1.16 Portfolios ranking and H&L relative performance. . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.17 Real returns on own savings over the previous 12 months. . . . . . . . 38
1.18 Survey observation numbers by method of collection . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.19 Sample selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.20 Modified Sharpe Ratio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4
Acknowledgements
I want to thank my supervisors, Pablo Beker, Dan Bernhardt and Herakles Pole-
marchakis for all their help, for the many hours I spent working with them, for their
encouragement, patience and honesty. I also thank CONICYT and the Department
of Economics of the University of Warwick for their financial support.
To Clemente, thanks for making Thursdays the best day of the week. To
Stephanie, thanks for keeping me en garde. I love you both.
5
Declaration
This thesis is submitted to the University of Warwick in support of my application
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It has not been submitted in any previous
application for any degree. Chapter one has been composed in collaboration with
Dan Bernhardt, and Mario Sanclemente, who helped me in conducting the survey
and analyzing its data. The survey had the approval of the Humanities and Social
Sciences Research Ethics Committee, Ethical Application Reference: 135/14-15.
Chapter two has been composed in collaboration with Pablo Beker.
6
Abstract
In Chapter 1 we document how pension investments by individuals in the Chilean
social security system are influenced by portfolio recommendations of Happy and
Loaded, a pension advice firm. Following H&L’s recommendations about which of
five portfolios to invest in, investors shift amounts that often exceed 20% of portfo-
lios value and 1.3% of Chilean annual GDP, in a week. We uncover what drives in-
vestment recommendations, the resulting return consequences for the Chilean stock
market and social security portfolios, and the characteristics of followers and their
investment outcomes. Paradoxically, investors who followed H&L’s advice would
have earned more by sticking with their original portfolio over time, regardless of
the portfolio selected. These findings provide a cautionary tale for the design of
privatized social security systems.
In chapter 2 we study the value of public information in a stochastic pure ex-
change economy where agents trade assets in financial markets to reallocate risk,
and a subset of those agents face a mandatory savings constraint. As the mandatory
savings constraint depends on equilibrium prices, changes in information may allow
a Planner that faces the same constraints as the agents in terms of the available
assets, information, and savings constraints, to obtain Pareto improvements relative
to the equilibrium without information. Changes in information cause the poste-
riors to change, thus affecting equilibrium prices and shifting the constraints that
the Planner has to satisfy. We provide conditions for the arrival of new information
before trading to obtain ex-post and ex-ante welfare improvements relative to the
initial equilibrium without information. The reaction of prices to the arrival of new
information is key in our analysis. We relate the value of information in exchange
economies with the literature on Bayesian persuasion.
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Chapter 1
The Pied Piper of Pensioners
1.1 Introduction
On March 6, 2012, the Chilean government took the unprecedented step of ordering
Felices y Forrados (Happy and Loaded, henceforth H&L) to cease providing pen-
sioners guidance on portfolio choice for their retirement savings. The government’s
action stemmed from concerns that massive swings in investment flows induced by
investors following H&L’s advice were destabilizing the Chilean economy. The or-
der was revoked on April 24, 2012. Still, the government’s worries did not cease,
as indicated by an April 26, 2013 report from the Financial Stability Board stating
“...movements between different pension funds have increased markedly...movements
of this quantity, in such a short term, affect the system as a whole by affecting the
prices of some financial assets, creating stress on market infrastructures...”
Chile’s private social security system is perhaps the most widely-emulated social
security design in the world. More than 20 countries have adopted variants of the
Chilean design (Berstein, Larra´ın, Pino, and Moro´n (2006)), including countries in
Latin America,1 central and eastern Europe,2 Africa (Nigeria), Asia (Kazakhstan,
Singapore), and developed countries (Sweden, Denmark). Aspects of the Chilean
design are central to a recent Blackstone proposal for a privatized social security
plan in the United States.3 It is clearly important for policy makers to understand
the consequences of its design for Chile, and to understand how consequences might
differ in other countries, in order to gain insights into how the design could be
improved.
The Chilean social security system is a fully funded, defined contribution, multi-
fund, personal account system. On December 31, 2014, total savings were $165
billion USD, or roughly 60% of the Chilean GDP in 2014. Average pension savings
were $38,600 USD, or about 54% of total net wealth (Behrman, Mitchell, Soo, and
1 Peru, Colombia, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Mexico, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Nicaragua and Ecuador.
2 Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, and Slovakia.
3 See Ghilarducci, James, et al. (2016).
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Bravo (2012)). Formal workers must save 10% of monthly earnings. Workers choose
a Pension Fund Administrator (AFP) to manage their investments. Government
regulation sharply limits asset allocations by AFPs to reduce the possibility of poor
pension performance that could endanger retirement savings. Each AFP only offers
five types of funds ordered from A to E by their riskiness. Fund A, which is largely
invested in foreign mutual funds, ETFs and domestic stocks, is the riskiest; while
fund E, which is invested mainly in government and Central Bank bonds, and bank
deposits, is the safest.
This chapter shows how the design of Chile’s social security system led to mas-
sive, coordinated portfolio reallocations following the recommendations of a single
financial advisor, H&L. These transfers often exceeded one percent of Chile’s annual
GDP, sometimes exceeding the total monthly trading volume in domestic stocks. We
uncover what drives H&L’s recommendations, and show how they altered invest-
ment strategies of pensioners. We derive the impacts on asset prices in domestic
financial markets, including portfolio and stock market returns. Using administra-
tive and survey data, we document that followers of H&L are far wealthier than the
typical pension investor, with over twice the savings. Followers are also more edu-
cated, quite financially sophisticated and informed about how their pension returns
compare to alternative buy-and-hold strategies. Nonetheless, we find that most in-
vestors who flocked to follow H&L’s advice would have done better to stick with
their original portfolio over time, no matter which portfolio they originally held. We
show that most of this underperformance emerges because not only have pension
investors come to believe that H&L’s recommendations have value, but so has the
market. As a result, stock prices adjust to reflect H&L’s recommendations before
pension investors can transfer their funds, with the outcome that pension investors
end up buying high and selling low. These findings provide a cautionary tale for the
design of privatized social security systems.
H&L, founded in July 2011, charges a small annual fee of about $24 USD for
advice.4 Advice takes the form of emails, issued after the close of a trading day, typi-
cally instructing clients to switch 50% or 100% of savings from portfolio A to portfo-
lio E, or vice versa. Between July 2011 and September 2016, H&L issued instructions
to switch savings from one portfolio to another on 35 occasions. Using daily flow
data from October 2011 to September 2016, we first document that investors have
come to believe that H&L’s advice is sound. H&L started with 54 paid followers,
and did not have new customers until after its 4th recommendation.5 Remarkably,
4 H&L’s founder claims to have developed a statistical model, based on Harry Markowitz’ 1952
model, that allows him to forecast the performance of social security portfolios.
5 We have H&L’s administrative data through September 30, 2016. These data include the
payment history of all clients plus basic demographics like gender and age. H&L has two types
of clients: premium and basic. Premium followers pay an annual fee of $24USD, while basic
followers have a free three month trial period, in which they receive announcements with a three
day lag. The number of premium followers reached 66,000 in August 2016, and there are many
more second-hand followers.
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beginning with the sixth recommendation, accompanied by surges in Google trends
and Google searches for H&L, each new recommendation led to net shifts of more
than 25,000 investors (a mix of paid subscribers and second-hand followers) to the
newly endorsed portfolio, and away from the portfolio that had previously been en-
dorsed. Strikingly, the five recommendations issued between April 2013 and January
2014 on a date t− 1,6 on average, led over 100,000 (net) investors to switch to the
recommended portfolio over the first six trading days that their requests could be
executed. The average funds shifted following these five recommendations exceeded
20% of portfolio E’s value at the time of the new recommendation, equivalent to
more than 1.3% of the Chilean GDP in 2013. Cumulative net flows to the risky
portfolios A and B were of comparable magnitudes. H&L-recommended changes
directly precede every large shift in pension investments.
Having established the remarkable impact of H&L’s advice on pension invest-
ments, we investigate what drives H&L’s advice, whether investors benefit, and
whether and how H&L’s advice affects portfolio returns, and domestic stock mar-
kets.
1. We find that H&L’s advice primarily reflects the immediate past performance
of the Chilean stock market: very high past returns on the Chilean market
directly precede recommendations to transfer funds into risky portfolio A and
out of safe portfolio E; while very bad returns are associated with the opposite
recommendation pattern.
2. We find positive announcement effects on the day following a recommendation
of portfolio A (negative announcement effects after a recommendation of port-
folio E) for portfolios A through D and Chilean stock market indexes, followed
by positive cumulative excess returns on days t + 3 to t + 7 where portfolio
transfers are high.
These latter results lead naturally to a conjecture that the induced transfers of funds
in and out of portfolios must have had short-run price impacts on domestic equity
prices. This leads us to search for impacts of these mass transfers on stock market
volume. There are none. Domestic stock market volumes are not unusually high on
days where portfolio transfers are high: AFPs seem to accommodate mass transfers
by adjusting positions in liquid foreign equity markets, and not illiquid domestic
markets.
We then ask: do investors benefit from following H&L’s advice? We get at this in
two ways. We first use H&L’s payment records to compute returns for each follower
starting with the first announcement he could follow until the last announcement
for which his account with H&L was active, i.e., until his subscription expired.
6 The timing convention is that date t − 1 is the date on which the recommendation is made
(after the close of trading), so that the recommendation is known at the open of trading day t.
10
We then determine whether a follower’s return exceeded that from a buy-and-hold
strategy for each portfolio. We find that most followers are hurt by following H&L’s
advice: fewer than 10% of followers beat portfolio E and fewer than 30% beat their
riskiest option. We then compare the performance of H&L’s strategy with that
of holding the other portfolios, starting at any of the first twenty announcements
through September 30, 2016. Without adjusting for risk, an investor would have
done better following H&L from the first announcement than investing in any of the
other five portfolios. However, only 54 investors did this; and at any other starting
point H&L is not the option with the highest return. Indeed, at almost all other
starting points, investors would have done better to stick with whichever portfolio
they held, no matter what it was.
These results beg the question: why do so many investors come to believe that
H&L’s recommendations have value? We establish a sense in which H&L’s recom-
mendations look very good. Someone who hypothetically could transfer funds at
the exact moment a recommendation was made—rather than one day later—would
have earned returns that exceed those from buying and holding any of the other
portfolios for nine of the first fourteen recommendations, and would outperformed
portfolio A for fifteen of the first twenty recommendations. Thus, this hypothetical
possibility reverses the ordering of returns. Paradoxically, what harms followers is
not that they come to believe H&L’s recommendations have value, but rather that
the entire market does. As a result, the Chilean stock market experiences a large
positive announcement effect following a recommendation by H&L to switch to the
risky portfolio A, and a large negative announcement effect after a recommendation
to switch away from the risky portfolio A. Followers cannot switch portfolios in time
to benefit from the announcement effect—they end up buying high and selling low,
reducing their cumulative portfolio returns by 20-25%. The difference in results
reflects the time it takes AFPs to shift funds between pension portfolios and the
complex pricing rules used by AFPs to value transferred funds; pricing rules that
may conceal from investors the fact that they do not benefit from the announcement
effect.
These findings lead us to investigate further why individuals follow H&L, despite
the under-performance of their investments. To identify whether followers are less
financially sophisticated or less informed, we surveyed a large sample of over 8,700
current followers of H&L. We then contrast our survey results with findings regarding
the population characteristics of pension investors derived from the broad Social
Protection Survey (EPS).
Surprising results obtain. H&L followers are far more sophisticated than the
average investor. In particular, they are more educated, with higher incomes and
over twice the savings of the average investor. They are also much more likely
to make additional voluntary savings, highlighting their patience and understand-
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ing of the tax benefits. Answers to questions related to risk diversification and
compound interest underscore that H&L followers are extremely financially sophis-
ticated, especially relative to non-followers. One striking illustration of this is that
64% of followers correctly calculate a compound interest problem vs. only 3-5% of
non-followers! One might then conjecture that followers are just uninformed about
portfolio returns or that they systematically over-estimate returns from following
H&L vis a` vis buy-and-hold strategies. This conjecture is also false. Followers are
well informed about portfolio returns. Among followers providing full rankings, 57%
correctly rank the 12 month returns on portfolios A, C and E, and slightly more
than half correctly rank portfolio E’s return above H&L’s. Paradoxically, the key
reasons that investors give for why they follow H&L are: higher returns, minimize
losses, and they trust H&L more than their AFP.
Our findings have implications for the design of privatized social security systems
in which individuals have some choice over pension investments that may serve as
a primary source of retirement funds. These lessons are relevant for the many
countries that use variants of the Chilean design. One goal of such systems is to
align investments better with individual attitudes toward risk. A second goal is
to minimize risks of inadequate retirement savings due to bad investment choices
or moral hazard by investment advisors. The Chilean design addresses this by
sharply limiting the portfolio choices available to investors. We show that despite
these constraints—or perhaps because of them—investors may be harmed due to
responses by the market. Our analysis highlights the risk that with few portfolio
alternatives, information arrival, here taking the form of recommendations by H&L,
can lead to massive coordinated reallocations of funds. In Chile, liquidity provision
is not overwhelmed due to the limited portfolio exposure to the domestic market,
which allows AFPs to accommodate large portfolio transfers by adjusting holdings
of liquid foreign assets, mitigating price impacts. However, greater exposure to
domestic markets—as might occur in the United States or England—could magnify
the ramifications of transfers induced by such information arrival.
Ghilarducci, James, et al. (2016) lay out a personal savings plan to confront what
they term “the US retirement savings crisis.” This Blackstone plan contains many
features of the Chilean system: savings are mandatory, private accounts are managed
by professionals, and it is built on personal choice. The authors do not detail the set
of portfolio alternatives nor specify how individuals can change portfolio selection.
We highlight mechanisms and considerations that should enter the design of these
details.
1.1.1 Related literature
Our work contributes to a broad literature that studies how the design of a social se-
curity system affects the economy. Edwards (1998) argues that the massive amount
12
of assets held by AFPs helped Chile by contributing to a more dynamic and modern
capital market, allowing private firms to rely on long-term financing. Joubert (2015)
builds a dynamic model analyzing how the Chilean pension system affects a house-
hold’s labor supply, formal/informal sector choice, and saving decisions. He shows
that the presence of a large informal sector, not covered by the mandatory savings
system, offers workers competitive earnings opportunities, thus mandatory pensions
contributions can create a significant reduction in formality and tax revenue. Mesa,
Bravo, Behrman, Mitchell, and Todd (2008) analyze savings, participation patterns
and the financial literacy of investors in the Chilean social security system. They
find that only a small fraction knows basic key details such a the payroll tax or
commission rates.
Our analysis also pertains to a literature on the informativeness of analyst rec-
ommendations. Just as investors in Chile come to believe H&L’s recommendations,
as reflected by the announcement returns, researchers find that recommendation
upgrades by financial analysts are associated with positive announcement returns
(Stickel (1995), Womack (1996), Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2006),
Ivkovic´ and Jegadeesh (2004), Loh and Stulz (2010)). More generally, analyst rec-
ommendation changes contain relevant information, and investment strategies based
on portfolio constructions that use recommendation information have positive value
(Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2001), Jegadeesh, J. Kim, Krische, and
Lee (2004), Jegadeesh and W. Kim (2009), Boni and Womack (2006)). Consis-
tent with this, Dahlquist, Martinez, and So¨derlind (2016) find that active investors
in Sweden’s Premium Pension System tend to follow recommendations of financial
advisors, and that, gross of advisor fees, active investors seem to outperform pas-
sive ones. Jegadeesh, J. Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) show that analysts often
recommend stocks with positive momentum; we show that H&L adopts an even
shorter-horizon momentum strategy.7
Our analysis also relates to a literature showing that better-performing mutual
funds draw greater cash inflows (Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Zheng (1999); see
Bernhardt and R. J. Davies (2009) for a theoretical model). Of note, we show that
the advent of H&L changed how individuals make pension investments. Prior to
H&L, shifts in investments reflected long-term portfolio performances: investments
flowed to portfolios that had higher returns over the previous three months. Once
H&L began to have influence, only its recommendations (which we show are based
on the immediate past performance of the market) affected portfolio flows.
Carlin and S. W. Davies (2016) theoretically analyze the implementation of state
sponsored retirement plans, showing how the optimal menu of options and default
option depends on the financial sophistication of participants and their behavioral
biases. They assume that only unsophisticated investors make bad active trading
7 Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) and Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2015) provide theoretical
analyses of strategic financial advisor behavior.
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decisions, making it optimal to limit access to risky portfolios. Here we provide
evidence that agents adopting active strategies tend to do worse; but in Chile these
investors are far more sophisticated than the average investor.
The fact that so many followers pay for advice that seems to have harmed them
has suggestive links to Powdthavee and Riyanto (2015). Their experimental analysis
shows that people can be induced to believe in an “expert” who provides “trans-
parently useless” advice. People pay for the advice, perceiving a hot hand after a
string of successes; while long streaks of incorrect predictions generate beliefs that
the “unlucky” agent’s luck was likely to revert.
1.1.2 The Chilean social security system
The Chilean Social Security System has three key pillars: a welfare pillar, a manda-
tory contribution pillar and a voluntary savings pillar. For a full description see
Superintendence of Pensions (2010). The mandatory contribution pillar is a defined
contribution, multi-fund, personal account system. Each worker accumulates sav-
ings in a personal account until retirement. Formal workers must save at least 10%
of monthly wages up to a cap. Participation by self-employed workers was voluntary
prior to 2018.
The savings accounts are privately managed by the AFPs. There are currently
six AFPs. AFPs are highly regulated and face constraints on their investments.
Individuals choose among five portfolios, portfolios A to E, which differ in their
exposure to stocks and other variable yield instruments. The portfolios are ordered
according to riskiness: Portfolio A is the riskiest, while portfolio E is the safest.
Table 1.1 presents the distribution of assets in each portfolio on the last day of 2014.
Of note, less than 20% of the risk in portfolios A and B reflects exposure to domestic
securities; most of the risk exposure is to foreign assets such as ETFs or mutual
funds. Further (unreported) investigation reveals that the composition of domestic
stock holdings is very similar across portfolios; the portfolios differ largely only
according to the scale factor weighting domestic stock holdings. This composition
can vary within a month: AFPs alter their holdings in response to market conditions.
In particular, we will provide evidence that following large portfolio shifts, AFPs do
not alter investments in domestic equities. Instead, they accommodate these shifts
in their holdings of more liquid (foreign) assets. In practice, the returns of portfolios
A through E are similar across AFPs; see Table 1.2.8
Individuals make two important choices—the choice of administrator and the
allocations of savings across portfolios. Men under the age of 55 and women under
50 face no constraints on portfolio choices; and no restrictions apply to voluntary
8 AFPs differ more in terms of the fees that they charge. H&L’s recommendation that its
followers select one of two specific AFPs—one due to higher returns, and the other due to lower
fees—has not varied over time. However, H&L’s motto is “if you are happy with your AFP, stick
with it.”
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Table 1.1: Total assets of each portfolio (millions $US) and asset distribution (in %) on
12/31/2014.
A B C D E
Total assets 26,348 27,169 61,277 26,385 24,253
Asset distribution
Domestic stocks 11.8 12.8 10.0 3.8 0.7
Domestic mutual and investment funds 2.5 2.6 2.4 0.9 0.1
Foreign ETFs 16.6 12.2 9.4 6.5 3.7
Foreign mutual and investment funds 61.9 45.3 32.6 21.5 1.9
Other foreign assets 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.7
Central bank bonds 0.4 3.7 5.9 9.4 15.0
Government bonds 0.7 7.6 14.4 22.7 28.3
Bank bonds 1.6 4.6 8.5 11.6 11.7
Domestic firm bonds 1.8 4.5 8.6 9.4 10.2
Deposits 0.3 3.5 3.3 8.9 22.9
Others 1.2 2.4 3.8 3.9 3.8
Table 1.2: Real annual returns across AFPs: 27 Sept 2002-Aug 2015
Portfolio CAPITAL CUPRUM HABITAT PLANVITAL PROVIDA*
A 6.78% 6.83% 6.88% 6.43% 6.78%
B 5.75% 5.90% 5.85% 5.67% 5.50%
C 5.13% 5.68% 5.65% 5.29% 5.08%
D 4.86% 5.18% 5.19% 4.58% 4.67%
E 4.23% 4.20% 4.33% 3.47% 3.78%
*MODELO, the 6th AFP, entered 2010, and had similar returns over that subperiod.
savings. Older workers cannot select portfolio A, and pensioners cannot select port-
folio B (for mandated savings). A worker who does not choose a fund is assigned
a default option that places weights on portfolios B, C and D that depend on the
worker’s age. Workers are otherwise free to shift savings from one portfolio or AFP
to another, and there are no fees associated with such transfers. Transfers among
portfolios within an AFP are made four working days after a request,9 unless the to-
tal transfer request from a particular fund exceeds 5% of its value, in which case the
excess is delayed to the next working day, on a first come first serve basis. Transfers
between AFPs are delayed until the first working day of the following month if made
during the first fifteen days of a month; otherwise they are delayed until the fifteenth
day of the following month. Using the convention that date t is the first trading
day after a recommendation to switch savings from one portfolio to another, AFPs
first transfer savings based on a recommendation on trading day t+ 3. Importantly,
when a transfer is made on t + 3 due to an investor acting on a recommendation
made after close on day t − 1, an AFP uses asset prices on day t (e.g., weighted
average for domestic stocks and closing prices for foreign stocks) to value the funds
being transferred.
9 This delayed response by AFPs is administrative in nature.
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1.2 H&L’s impact
1.2.1 Portfolio transfers
H&L makes recommendations after the close of a trading day. Figure 1.1 presents
overwhelming evidence that social security investors come to believe in H&L recom-
mendations: their new recommendations explain the bulk of transfers in and out of
the different portfolios.10 Beginning with the fifth recommendation by H&L, advice
to switch from A to E causes funds to flow from portfolio A to E, and advice to
switch from E to A leads to flows from E to A. Not only is every large shift in
pension investments directly preceded by a recommendation from H&L to redirect
investments in that way, but so is every moderate shift, save one.
H&L’s administrative records provide us the number of official (paid) followers.
To estimate the number of second-hand followers, given the age restrictions on who
can hold portfolios A and B, we use recommendations to move all money in or out
of portfolio E that all investors can follow. A conservative estimate of the number
of second-hand followers is given by the net number of accounts shifted on days t+3
through t+ 8 in the direction suggested by a recommendation minus the number of
official followers. The measure is conservative because some paying followers may not
follow a given recommendation.11 Table 1.3 shows that by the 11th recommendation,
H&L had more than 100,000 followers. The table also reveals that followers have
more than double the average savings of typical pension investors.
Table 1.3: Number of followers, estimated number of second hand followers and
their average savings switched (CLP), and total number of members of the system
and their average savings in the month of the announcement.
Recommendation Followers System
Number Type Official Second hand Mean savings switched Members Mean savings
5 buy E 1,113 8,201 16,124,583 9,169,709 7,061,000
6 sell E 3,168 19,430 19,020,284 9,169,709 7,061,000
7 buy E 3,587 30,688 17,687,873 9,220,325 7,165,000
8 sell E 4,456 21,627 17,643,342 9,220,325 7,165,000
9 buy E 7,486 46,309 17,106,715 9,220,325 7,165,000
10 sell E 17,130 45,696 18,414,688 9,373,955 7,521,000
11 buy E 18,010 86,994 17,434,146 9,461,060 7,453,000
12 sell E 27,132 76,054 17,426,833 9,509,439 7,637,000
13 buy E 42,304 79,830 16,582,820 9,509,439 7,637,000
14 sell E 44,935 45,818 16,565,331 9,509,439 7,637,000
15 buy E 45,736 66,489 17,093,872 9,634,711 8,149,000
20 buy E 51,431 55,226 19,634,988 9,746,467 9,079,000
Investors who followed H&L’s first few recommendations earned higher returns
than those who did not change portfolio allocations. Figure 1.2 shows that—likely
as a result—H&L experienced a massive upsurge in media coverage and investor
10 Daily data on portfolio flows around the initial recommendation on July 27, 2011 do not exist.
11Mean savings of followers are even more conservatively estimated as they may only shift some
savings.
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Figure 1.1: H&L recommendations and daily net flows to portfolios A and E (billions
of CLP).
17
Figure 1.2: Investors interest, media coverage, and new subscriptions.
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attention followed by massive numbers of investors beginning to follow H&L’s advice.
We document this surge using data from Google trends, searching for the phrase
“Felices y Forrados.” Figure 1.2 shows the Google trend index, taking on the value
of 100 in the month where the most users “Googled” H&L, and a “Google search”
series, constructed using a monthly search on Google of the same phrase. We only
count results from media sites, news sites, and opinion blogs. Both series show
similar trends. H&L was almost unknown before 2012. Media coverage and interest
from Internet users increase and then explode, peaking in July 2013; after this point,
interest in H&L remains steady. We see that the numbers of new clients closely track
these Google indexes.
Table 1.4 shows the daily net flows to portfolios after recommendations. For the
last six recommendations to shift 100% of funds from portfolio A to portfolio E or
vice versa,12 the net inflows/outflows for each of these portfolios exceed 1,000 billion
CLP. These flows represent as much as 25% of the total value of portfolio E as of
day t + 2, or more than 1.5% of the annual Chilean GDP. These flows reveal that
pension investors believe that H&L’s recommendations contain material information
about the future performances of portfolios. The data show heavy flows of savings
into the recommended portfolio following a recommendation on date t on days t+ 3
to t+8, but not at earlier dates.13 Underscoring the high fraction of active investors
influenced by H&L’s advice, Superintendence of Pensions (2013) using data through
May 2013, found that 60% of pension investors used the default investment strategy.
12All other recommendations, the bulk of which were made later, were to shift 50% of funds
from one of portfolios A, C and E to another.
13The patterns in Figure 1.1 and Table 1.4 also show up in net numbers of accounts shifted.
Portfolios B and C follow similar patterns to those documented in Figure 1.1 and Table 1.4 for
portfolio A, but they are of smaller magnitudes. This reflects that some investors are over the age
limit for investing in portfolio A, making portfolios B or C their closest feasible alternative.
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Table 1.4: Net flows to portfolios (in billions of CLP) around new recommendation days.
Day t represents the first trading day after a recommendation is made. Net flow to portfolio
X on day t+ s is defined as the inflow minus the outflow to portfolio X on day t+ s.
Portfolio A
Date From To t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 7 t + 8 sum sum
value on t+2
13-Oct-2011 E A 0 -3 1 -1 -2 1 -4 0.00
23-Nov-2011 A E -8 -21 -26 -16 -3 -3 -76 -0.01
12-Jan-2012 E A -1 0 -3 -3 -1 -2 -12 0.00
30-Mar-2012 A E -18 -87 -9 1 -1 3 -110 -0.01
20-Jun-2012 E A 137 130 99 20 2 -4 385 0.03
29-Jun-2012 A E -209 -177 -10 -6 -2 -7 -412 -0.03
20-Jul-2012 E A 211 109 61 4 -3 3 384 0.03
30-Aug-2012 A E -217 -193 -153 -22 -12 -8 -605 -0.05
3-Jan-2013 E A 289 273 191 50 26 21 850 0.06
4-Apr-2013 A E -223 -245 -244 -208 -160 -142 -1223 -0.08
18-Jul-2013 E A 378 357 281 249 95 22 1382 0.11
19-Aug-2013 A E -304 -313 -269 -248 -207 -63 -1404 -0.10
9-Sep-2013 E A 405 356 272 116 10 2 1162 0.09
27-Jan-2014 A E -353 -348 -273 -242 -134 -22 -1372 -0.09
7-Mar-2014 E E+C -13 -29 -16 -6 -9 -17 -89 -0.01
4-Aug-2014 E+C E -52 -30 -27 -24 -7 -9 -148 -0.01
20-Aug-2014 E E+A 375 133 48 16 18 13 603 0.04
3-Nov-2014 E+A A 345 291 61 37 108 39 881 0.05
16-Dec-2014 A E -397 -394 -305 -232 -67 -6 -1400 -0.08
13-Feb-2015 E E+A 247 206 94 31 24 11 613 0.04
19-Mar-2015 E+A A 311 355 117 85 14 6 888 0.05
14-May-2015 A E+A -301 -170 -61 -50 -4 2 -584 -0.03
9-Jul-2015 E+A C+E -492 -292 -108 -46 4 -2 -936 -0.05
25-Aug-2015 C+E E -239 -210 -180 -45 7 -14 -681 -0.04
14-Oct-2015 E E+C 8 -22 -9 16 1 -3 -9 0.00
27-Oct-2015 E+C E -29 -30 -15 -12 -4 -2 -93 -0.01
17-Dec-2015 E E+A 293 363 87 87 201 342 1372 0.08
23-Dec-2015 E+A A 201 342 140 31 14 5 733 0.04
7-Jan-2016 A E+A -259 -235 -52 -44 -9 -7 -605 -0.03
18-Jan-2016 E+A E -282 -360 -100 -115 -109 -60 -1026 -0.06
23-Feb-2016 E E+C -14 -24 -19 -20 -11 -19 -107 -0.01
2-May-2016 E+C E -34 -58 -29 -23 -9 -6 -158 -0.01
7-Sep-2016 E E+C -5 -11 -12 -14 -3 -57 -101 -0.01
14-Sep-2016 E+C E -57 -32 -11 -19 -8 -7 -135 -0.01
Portfolio E
Date From To t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 7 t + 8 sum sum
value on t+2
13-Oct-2011 E A 3 8 5 7 10 2 35 0.01
23-Nov-2011 A E 18 36 45 30 9 8 146 0.03
12-Jan-2012 E A 7 3 8 9 7 7 41 0.01
30-Mar-2012 A E 22 128 10 -3 -1 -5 150 0.03
20-Jun-2012 E A -166 -161 -106 -17 5 14 -430 -0.06
29-Jun-2012 A E 299 253 19 13 9 13 606 0.09
20-Jul-2012 E A -281 -133 -64 3 10 5 -460 -0.06
30-Aug-2012 A E 310 285 240 40 27 18 920 0.13
3-Jan-2013 E A -379 -366 -270 -71 -38 -32 -1157 -0.13
4-Apr-2013 A E 303 353 364 313 250 248 1831 0.25
18-Jul-2013 E A -474 -475 -360 -335 -127 -27 -1799 -0.17
19-Aug-2013 A E 402 424 376 365 330 128 2025 0.23
9-Sep-2013 E A -508 -474 -367 -147 -8 0 -1504 -0.13
27-Jan-2014 A E 469 466 385 352 209 38 1918 0.19
7-Mar-2014 E E+C -253 -252 -90 -7 3 21 -579 -0.05
4-Aug-2014 E+C E 422 221 107 70 33 19 871 0.07
20-Aug-2014 E E+A -500 -181 -57 -20 -30 -19 -807 -0.06
3-Nov-2014 E+A A -458 -395 -80 -51 -155 -53 -1191 -0.09
16-Dec-2014 A E 578 561 452 383 111 9 2094 0.17
13-Feb-2015 E E+A -366 -295 -152 -52 -34 -20 -919 -0.06
19-Mar-2015 E+A A -429 -479 -154 -119 -19 -8 -1208 -0.09
14-May-2015 A E+A 419 234 86 66 5 0 809 0.07
9-Jul-2015 E+A C+E 304 212 83 10 -14 -1 594 0.05
25-Aug-2015 C+E E 661 642 510 168 1 42 2025 0.14
14-Oct-2015 E E+C -535 -278 -88 -90 -22 -4 -1016 -0.06
27-Oct-2015 E+C E 529 359 103 60 12 3 1065 0.07
17-Dec-2015 E E+A -422 -496 -108 -108 -272 -450 -1857 -0.11
23-Dec-2015 E+A A -272 -450 -185 -38 -17 -8 -970 -0.06
7-Jan-2016 A E+A 384 342 75 70 22 15 907 0.06
18-Jan-2016 E+A E 436 553 157 194 186 110 1635 0.11
23-Feb-2016 E E+C -348 -264 -50 -16 19 14 -644 -0.03
2-May-2016 E+C E 404 523 114 91 23 17 1173 0.06
7-Sep-2016 E E+C -392 -408 -95 -61 -2 489 -470 -0.02
14-Sep-2016 E+C E 489 368 105 100 42 23 1127 0.05
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Table 1.5 provides other metrics for the amounts of funds transferred. For each
recommendation, we compare the cumulative net transfers to portfolio E on days
t+3 to t+8 with measures of the “size” of the Chilean economy. These net portfolio
reallocations can exceed 5% of GDP for the associated quarter; and they sometimes
exceed the total value of all trade of domestic stocks on the Santiago Stock Exchange
in the month of the recommendation.
Table 1.5: Net flow to portfolio E (t+ 3 to t+ 8) as percentage of: the value of portfolio
E in t+ 2, the domestic GDP in the quarter of the recommendation, and the total value
of transactions in domestic stocks in the Santiago stock exchange in the month of the
announcement.
Recom. Direction Value at t+ 2 of Quarterly monthly total dollar trading
# of Recom. of Portfolio E GDP shifted volume in domestic stocks
5 A to E 2.894 0.48 7.52
6 E to A -6.020 -1.36 -15.13
7 A to E 8.950 1.91 21.35
8 E to A -6.133 -1.47 -22.75
9 A to E 12.578 2.93 57.34
10 E to A -12.789 -3.48 -46.11
11 A to E 25.438 5.48 99.24
12 E to A -17.081 -5.33 -105.40
13 A to E 22.760 6.00 137.09
14 E to A -13.257 -4.45 -83.67
15 A to E 18.671 5.35 83.14
16 E to E+C -4.647 -1.62 -40.21
17 E+C to E 6.942 2.41 43.93
18 E to E+A -5.856 -2.23 -40.68
19 E+A to A -8.882 -3.01 -38.71
20 A to E 16.784 5.29 169.24
21 E to E+A -6.290 -2.38 -75.35
22 E+A to A -8.849 -3.12 -78.12
23 A to E+A 6.734 2.10 56.24
24 E+A to E+C 4.568 1.54 61.22
25 C+E to E 14.438 5.24 198.62
26 E to E+C -6.231 -2.44 -99.69
27 E+C to E 6.971 2.56 104.55
28 E to E+A -11.424 -4.46 -205.00
29 E+A to A -6.413 -2.33 -107.08
30 A to E+A 6.455 2.20 71.39
31 E+A to E 10.875 3.97 128.68
32 E to E+C -3.463 -1.56 -75.26
33 E+C to E 6.298 2.88 92.27
34 E to E+C -1.955 -1.15 -37.72
35 E+C to E 4.859 2.76 90.41
We next estimate flow regressions of the form:
yτ = α +
10∑
s=−3
βsδEτ (s) + τ ,
where yτ are daily flows on date τ (measured in percentage terms) as a function of
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the indicator function:
δEτ (s) =

ρ if τ − s is the first trading day after a recommendation to sell fraction ρ
of portfolio E,
−ρ if τ − s is the first trading day after a recommendation to buy fraction ρ
of portfolio E,
0 otherwise.
Thus, δEτ (0) = 1 if on the previous day τ − 1, H&L recommended shifting all
holdings from portfolio E to portfolio A.
The left panel of Table 1.6 presents results. The coefficients on the indicator
functions are very large and highly statistically significant on dates t + 3 to t + 9.
The astonishing fit (adjusted R2 of 0.64 for portfolio E) reveals that H&L’s advice
is the primary driver of fluctuations in transfers of funds between portfolios.14 The
findings indicate that (a) investors respond quickly and massively to recommenda-
tions; (b) there is no leakage of information about a recommendation prior to its
announcement—investors do not systematically shift in or out of a portfolio before
a new recommendation; and (c) investors finish responding to a recommendation
within a week.
To see whether investor responses differ according to the direction of a recom-
mendation (i.e., to or from A) we estimate the following regression:
yτ = α +
10∑
s=2
βsδEτ (s) +
10∑
s=2
φsδAτ (s) + τ ,
where yτ are daily flows on date τ (measured in percentage terms) as a function of:
δEτ (s) =

ρ if τ − s is the first trading day after a recommendation to sell fraction ρ
of portfolio E,
0 otherwise.
and
δAτ (s) =

ρ if τ − s is the first trading day after a recommendation to sell fraction ρ
of portfolio A,
0 otherwise.
14Empirical identification of the causal impact of H&L’s recommendations is clean: (a) Figures
1 and 2 show that reallocations and recommendations coincide only after investors started showing
interest in H&L as measured by the Google indicators; (b) the fact that only tiny numbers of
investors switched portfolios in the direction of H&L’s first few recommendations reveals that a
common force does not drive both recommendations and reallocations. Indeed, H&L only had 54
paid followers for its first four recommendations.
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Table 1.6: Recommendations and portfolio transfers. OLS regression of yτ = α +∑10
s=−3 βsδEτ (s) + τ and yτ = α+
∑10
s=2 βsδEτ (s) +
∑10
s=2 φsδAτ (s) + τ using daily data
for the period 12Oct2011–30Sep2016, where yτ is the percentage net flow to portfolio X
on day τ : yτ is the value of the inflow minus the value of the outflow to portfolio X on τ
divided by the value of the portfolio on day τ − 1.
A B C D E A B C D E
δE(−3) 0.007 -0.002 -0.002 0.007 0.036
(0.036) (0.013) (0.014) (0.004) (0.074)
δE(−2) 0.010 0.002 -0.027 0.006* 0.049
(0.029) (0.012) (0.025) (0.003) (0.047)
δE(−1) 0.061 0.018 -0.031 0.001 -0.018
(0.044) (0.018) (0.026) (0.003) (0.065)
δE(0) 0.062 0.016 -0.015* -0.002 -0.034
(0.046) (0.017) (0.008) (0.002) (0.070)
δE(1) 0.030 -0.000 -0.011* -0.002 0.013
(0.022) (0.010) (0.007) (0.003) (0.073)
δE(2) 0.062*** 0.020** -0.003 -0.002 -0.096* 0.061** 0.017* -0.003 -0.003 -0.039
(0.022) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002) (0.053) (0.024) (0.010) (0.005) (0.002) (0.048)
δE(3) 1.629*** 0.469*** 0.278*** -0.014** -3.683*** 1.749*** 0.482*** 0.260** -0.031*** -3.464***
(0.224) (0.065) (0.082) (0.007) (0.410) (0.370) (0.101) (0.117) (0.010) (0.596)
δE(4) 1.520*** 0.472*** 0.240*** -0.018** -3.458*** 1.501*** 0.470*** 0.219** -0.038*** -3.143***
(0.206) (0.064) (0.068) (0.008) (0.360) (0.342) (0.107) (0.097) (0.011) (0.588)
δE(5) 0.951*** 0.303*** 0.095*** -0.007 -2.051*** 0.882*** 0.272*** 0.078** -0.030*** -1.835***
(0.167) (0.055) (0.025) (0.006) (0.330) (0.234) (0.076) (0.032) (0.007) (0.443)
δE(6) 0.602*** 0.197*** 0.063*** 0.000 -1.263*** 0.439** 0.136** 0.048** -0.017*** -0.931***
(0.147) (0.049) (0.015) (0.005) (0.294) (0.173) (0.055) (0.019) (0.004) (0.358)
δE(7) 0.325*** 0.113*** 0.028*** -0.004 -0.648*** 0.198*** 0.069*** 0.012 -0.011*** -0.374**
(0.099) (0.034) (0.010) (0.004) (0.208) (0.074) (0.027) (0.010) (0.003) (0.167)
δE(8) 0.175*** 0.064** -0.005 0.002 -0.338** 0.165** 0.055** -0.039 -0.009** -0.227**
(0.062) (0.026) (0.023) (0.004) (0.145) (0.074) (0.025) (0.048) (0.004) (0.107)
δE(9) 0.097*** 0.040*** -0.006 -0.001 -0.191*** 0.122*** 0.043*** -0.030 -0.005 -0.181***
(0.032) (0.014) (0.017) (0.003) (0.069) (0.042) (0.015) (0.037) (0.003) (0.068)
δE(10) 0.104*** 0.038*** 0.015 -0.004 -0.162** 0.093** 0.034** 0.004 -0.007* -0.089
(0.037) (0.015) (0.011) (0.003) (0.073) (0.043) (0.015) (0.014) (0.004) (0.117)
δA(2) -0.076* -0.028* 0.004 0.001 0.173*
(0.040) (0.016) (0.007) (0.004) (0.095)
δA(3) -1.643*** -0.503*** -0.108 0.005 3.617***
(0.291) (0.095) (0.081) (0.010) (0.549)
δA(4) -1.624*** -0.499*** -0.142** 0.007 3.614***
(0.249) (0.077) (0.071) (0.013) (0.395)
δA(5) -1.032*** -0.330*** -0.063*** -0.006 2.166***
(0.247) (0.081) (0.020) (0.009) (0.494)
δA(6) -0.781*** -0.260*** -0.058*** -0.012 1.577***
(0.236) (0.081) (0.019) (0.008) (0.465)
δA(7) -0.461*** -0.159*** -0.042*** -0.003 0.948***
(0.177) (0.061) (0.016) (0.007) (0.368)
δA(8) -0.185* -0.075 -0.024 -0.012** 0.459*
(0.103) (0.047) (0.015) (0.006) (0.274)
δA(9) -0.069 -0.037 -0.014* -0.005** 0.207
(0.053) (0.026) (0.009) (0.003) (0.126)
δA(10) -0.118* -0.046* -0.014* 0.000 0.246**
(0.066) (0.026) (0.008) (0.004) (0.107)
Obs. 1,239 1,239 1,239 1,239 1,239 1,239 1,239 1,239 1,239 1,239
R2 0.545 0.481 0.161 0.030 0.649 0.566 0.500 0.087 0.080 0.603
Adj. R2 0.539 0.475 0.151 0.018 0.645 0.560 0.493 0.073 0.067 0.597
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Intercept not reported
The right panel of Table 1.6 shows that investor responses do not differ materially
according to the direction of a recommendation: a recommendation of portfolio A
leads to transfers into A and out of E that roughly equal transfers from portfolio A
and into E following a recommendation of E. Table 1.6 also reveals clear but muted
responses of investors in portfolios B and C to recommendations to switch to/from
E: the funds shifted in and out of portfolios B and C are less than 25% of those for
portfolio A. These “echo” shifts reflect that some investors are too old to invest in
portfolio A, making portfolios B or C their closest feasible alternative.
Did the advent of H&L change in other ways how investors allocated
savings? Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) have established
that higher past returns of a mutual fund increase cash flows into the fund. We now
modify Sirri and Tufano’s approach to study the relationship between measures of
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past performance of portfolio A and net flows to portfolios A and E to determine
whether this relationship changed once investors began following H&L’s advice.
Because there are no daily data on portfolio flows prior to October 2011, we use
monthly data for the period October 2002–September 2016. Table 1.7 presents OLS
estimates of the following equation:
Flowt = α +
(
3∑
s=1
β1,sReturn At−s +
3∑
s=1
β2,sRisk At−s + β3 log TAt−1
)
× (1− dt)
+
(
3∑
s=1
β4,sReturn At−s +
3∑
s=1
β5,sRisk At−s + β6 log TAt−1
)
× dt + β7dt + t.
Flowt is the net flow to portfolio X in month t as a percent of the total assets in X
on the last day of month t − 1; Return At−s is the monthly return on portfolio A
computed as the log difference using the price on the last day of month t − s and
the price on the last day of month t − (s + 1); Risk At−s is the standard deviation
of the daily returns of portfolio A in month t − s; and TAt−1 is the total assets of
portfolio A on the last day of month t − 1. We consider two formulations for the
dummy variable dt indicating H&L’s presence in the market: one where dt = 1 once
H&L enters the market in October 2011, so dt = 0 before October 2011; and one
where dt = 1 starting in April 2012, when substantial numbers of investors began
shifting investments in line with H&L’s recommendation.
Table 1.7 shows how H&L’s entry changed investor behavior. Prior to H&L, and
consistent with Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998), higher
lagged monthly returns of portfolio A led investors to shift funds into A and out of
E. After H&L’s entry, investments no longer vary with the long-term performance
of portfolio A—investors only rely on H&L.
1.2.2 Returns
Having established how H&L’s recommendations affected the flow of investors and
money in and out of portfolios, we now investigate asset returns around the recom-
mendation announcements. This lets us (a) uncover what drives H&L’s recommen-
dations to switch portfolios; (b) derive the informational consequences (announce-
ment effects) of recommendations for different assets; and (c) probe the impacts of
the portfolio transfers on asset returns.
To do this, we estimate regressions of the form:
yτ = α +
0∑
s=−2
βsδEτ (s) + β1δEτ (1 : 2) + β2δEτ (3 : 7) + β3δEτ (8 : 10) + τ ,
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Table 1.7: The effect of past performance on monthly cash flow to portfolios A and
E, before and after the emergence of H&L.
dt = 1 starting October 2011 dt = 1 starting April 2012
Port. A Port. E Port. A Port. E
Before H&L
Return At−1 0.212* -1.456*** 0.223** -1.437***
(0.110) (0.342) (0.099) (0.322)
Return At−2 0.210*** -0.882*** 0.204*** -0.876***
(0.077) (0.277) (0.070) (0.261)
Return At−3 0.176* -0.288 0.163* -0.282
(0.098) (0.192) (0.089) (0.178)
Risk At−1 1.057 -9.436** 1.117 -8.940**
(1.417) (4.608) (1.309) (4.393)
Risk At−2 1.311 -3.457 1.133 -3.744
(1.243) (4.665) (1.040) (4.280)
Risk At−3 -0.697 2.237 -0.695 2.373
(0.851) (2.702) (0.782) (2.469)
log TAt−1 -0.022*** 0.016** -0.022*** 0.015**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
After H&L
Return At−1 -0.097 0.022 -0.063 0.020
(0.219) (0.406) (0.236) (0.468)
Return At−2 0.131 -0.264 0.150 -0.253
(0.180) (0.365) (0.236) (0.502)
Return At−3 -0.178 0.319 -0.190 0.410
(0.163) (0.331) (0.217) (0.460)
Risk At−1 -2.180 1.132 -2.534 1.176
(4.286) (9.147) (5.067) (11.381)
Risk At−2 -3.968 10.778 -6.495 15.470
(3.551) (6.997) (5.182) (11.411)
Risk At−3 4.346* -9.525* 6.813** -11.427
(2.350) (4.962) (3.220) (7.191)
log TAt−1 -0.047 0.066 -0.040 0.040
(0.049) (0.097) (0.059) (0.118)
dt 0.770 -1.612 0.573 -0.864
(1.488) (2.935) (1.782) (3.546)
Constant 0.641*** -0.376* 0.638*** -0.354*
(0.192) (0.191) (0.189) (0.182)
Obs. 164 164 164 164
R2 0.399 0.359 0.408 0.363
Adj. R2 0.338 0.294 0.348 0.298
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
where yτ is the daily return
15 on day τ of a selected asset (social security portfolios
A and E,16 and IPSA stock market index).17 δEτ (0) is an indicator function that
takes on the value 1 if a recommendation was made on the previous day (τ − 1)
to sell portfolio E, it takes on the value -1 if a recommendation was made on the
previous day to buy portfolio E, and it is zero otherwise. δEτ (1 : 2) is the analogous
indicator function for recommendations made either one or two days earlier (i.e., on
days τ −2 or τ −3). The indicator function δEτ (3 : 7) captures days where portfolio
transfers are high following recommendations; and the indicator function δEτ (8 : 10)
captures days where portfolio transfers have largely returned to normal.
To control for market returns, we also augment regressions by adding the return
of a foreign stock market index as a regressor. We use the return on the MSCI
ACWI and MSCI World indexes as controls when using portfolio returns as a de-
15Returns are defined as: rτ = 100 (log(pτ )− log(pτ−1)).
16The website of the superintendency of pensions provides daily data on official prices for all
portfolios of all AFPs. These official prices reflect regulations that specify the prices used to value
each asset (e.g. closing price for foreign equity, or weighted average price for domestic stocks). We
use the weighted average price, lagged one day because the price of a portfolio on day τ reflects
the day τ − 1 prices of the underlying assets.
17 IPSA is an index of the 40 stocks with the highest annual volume from the set of stocks with
a market capitalization that exceed USD 200 MM and a free-float of at least 5%. The index is
market capitalization weighted and free float adjusted, and includes dividends.
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pendent variable.18 When using the return of a domestic stock market index as
a dependent variable, we use returns on the MSCI Emerging Markets and MSCI
Emerging Markets Latin America indexes.1920
Table 1.8: Recommendations and asset returns. OLS regression of yτ = α +∑0
s=−2 βsδEτ (s) + β1δEτ (1 : 2) + β2δEτ (3 : 7) + β3δEτ (8 : 10) + τ using daily data for
the period 3Jan2011–30Sep2016, where yτ is the daily return (in %) of a social security
portfolio, or stock market index.
Social Security Portfolios Stock Market
A A A E IPSA IPSA IPSA
δE(−2) 0.479*** 0.225*** 0.250*** -0.00379 0.750*** 0.308* 0.352**
(0.0809) (0.0741) (0.0736) (0.0184) (0.177) (0.174) (0.162)
δE(−1) 0.642*** 0.184** 0.204*** 0.000443 1.024*** 0.467*** 0.432**
(0.106) (0.0758) (0.0756) (0.0249) (0.186) (0.179) (0.172)
δE(0) 0.251* 0.176** 0.199** -0.0110 0.541** 0.264* 0.351**
(0.143) (0.0810) (0.0847) (0.0254) (0.224) (0.146) (0.152)
δE(1 : 2) -0.0635 -0.00894 -0.0147 -0.00210 -0.0220 0.0674 0.103
(0.0767) (0.0508) (0.0525) (0.0175) (0.137) (0.119) (0.116)
δE(3 : 7) 0.233*** 0.112*** 0.116*** 0.00642 0.280** 0.142 0.146*
(0.0699) (0.0370) (0.0382) (0.00863) (0.120) (0.0869) (0.0782)
δE(8 : 10) -0.0519 -0.0388 -0.0353 -0.0384* -0.252 -0.267* -0.251**
(0.0716) (0.0393) (0.0391) (0.0210) (0.159) (0.150) (0.128)
ACWI 0.419***
(0.0206)
World 0.403***
(0.0209)
Emerging Markets 0.488***
(0.0312)
Latin America 0.355***
(0.0207)
Observations 1,436 1,436 1,436 1,436 1,437 1,437 1,437
R2 0.048 0.501 0.484 0.006 0.045 0.356 0.385
Adjusted R2 0.044 0.499 0.482 0.002 0.041 0.353 0.382
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Intercept not reported
What drives H&L’s advice? Table 1.8 reveals that H&L’s advice overwhelmingly
reflects the immediate past performance of the Chilean stock market. On the two
trading days prior to a recommendation to switch into portfolio A and out of E,
on average, the Chilean stock market rose by 1.8%. Roughly the opposite occurs
prior to recommendations to switch out of portfolio A and into E. That is, following
good returns on the Chilean stock market, H&L recommends that investors hold
the risky portfolio A, and following bad returns on the market, H&L recommends
that they hold the safe portfolio E. This suggests that H&L employs a simple, very
short-term, momentum strategy.
18 The ACWI index captures large and mid-cap representation in 23 developed markets and 24
emerging markets countries. The World index captures large and mid cap representation in 23
developed markets countries.
19 The Emerging Markets index captures large and mid-cap representation in 24 emerging mar-
kets countries. The Emerging Markets Latin America index captures large and mid-cap represen-
tation for five emerging markets countries in Latin America.
20 Results similar to those for portfolio A obtain when using returns of portfolios B and C as
dependent variables. The magnitude of the effects fall due to the lesser risk exposure of these
portfolios. Findings similar to those for the IPSA index obtain for the IGPA index of all stocks on
the Santiago Exchange with an annual volume above UF 10,000 (US$400,000-450,000), free float
of at least 5% and a market presence of at least 5%, and for the INTER-10 index, which consists of
10 stocks selected from the IPSA, listed in foreign markets through ADRs, with the highest annual
volume or if we use indexes without dividends. We also considered the US$ over CLP exchange
rate and indexed Central Bank bonds.
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Table 1.9: Cumulative returns of the ACWI and VIX indexes.
Type of recommendation ACWI VIX
Increase risk exposure
2 0.07 -0.19
4 0.00 -0.05
6 0.03 -0.18
8 0.03 -0.17
10 0.02 -0.19
12 0.02 -0.03
14 0.02 -0.06
16 0.01 0.01
18 0.02 -0.15
19 0.02 -0.13
21 0.01 -0.09
22 0.03 -0.19
26 0.01 -0.09
28 0.00 -0.09
29 0.00 -0.23
32 0.04 -0.27
34 0.01 -0.07
Reducing risk exposure
1 0.00 0.19
3 -0.06 0.02
5 0.00 -0.01
7 -0.01 -0.02
9 0.00 0.12
11 0.00 0.11
13 -0.01 0.07
15 -0.02 0.37
17 -0.02 0.29
20 -0.04 0.36
23 0.01 -0.10
24 -0.02 0.08
25 -0.10 1.14
27 0.01 0.02
30 -0.04 0.25
31 -0.03 0.00
33 -0.01 0.17
35 -0.03 0.40
To reinforce this conclusion, we show that the cumulative return (the sum of daily
returns) of the ACWI and VIX indexes in the week before an announcement predict
the nature of the recommendation.21 Table 1.9 divides recommendations according
to whether the direction of the recommendation represents an increase or a reduction
in risk exposure. A momentum strategy suggests that preceding a recommendation
to increase risk exposure, we should see positive cumulative returns on the ACWI
index, and negative returns on the VIX index; and prior to a recommendation to
reduce risk exposure, the opposite should obtain. This is precisely what we find.
Indeed, prior to every recommendation to increase risk, the five day cumulative
return on the ACWI index is positive, and the analogous return on the VIX index
is negative. The opposite happens for the vast bulk of recommendations to reduce
risk exposure.22
Putting these results together with those in Table 1.7 proves revealing: it is not
21 The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) is a measure of market expectations of near-term volatility
conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices.
22These results are robust to choosing different short term horizons (e.g. four, six or seven days).
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that investors no longer base investments on past performance; rather, via the model
that H&L uses to formulate recommendations, investors have switched from basing
investments on intermediate-term historical performance to basing investments on
very recent market performance. Moreover, many more investors now implicitly
follow this momentum strategy.
Consequences of H&L’s advice. Table 1.8 also reveals positive announcement
effects on the day after a recommendation of portfolio A. Most notably, there are
abnormal returns of half a percent on the Chilean stock market, and smaller an-
nouncement effects for portfolio A that remain significant when we control for for-
eign market returns. In addition, after a recommendation of risky portfolio A on day
t− 1 there are positive abnormal returns on both the stock market and portfolio A
on days t+ 3 to t+ 7 where pension transfers are high, followed by slight reversals.
Similar return patterns emerge for portfolios B, C and D, where the magnitudes
decline as the riskiness of the portfolio declines, and there are no systematic return
patterns for portfolio E, which is comprised of very liquid, information-insensitive
securities.
At first blush, these results suggest that reinvestments by AFPs in response to
the portfolio reallocations on days t + 3 to t + 7 had price impacts. It looks as if
AFPs trades in the stock market induced by the re-allocations of pension savings
moved the market—it looks as if the market was not sufficiently liquid to absorb the
re-allocations. To investigate, we explore the impact of portfolio reallocations on
domestic stock market trading volume, regressing log of total daily trading volume
in millions of CLP on indicator functions that take on the value of one s trading
days after a new recommendation, for s = −2,−1, 0, 1...10. Table 1.10 presents
those results. Surprisingly, Figure 1.3 and Table 1.10 reveal that there is no pass
through from the massive portfolio re-allocations to stock market trading volume.
Trades by AFPs induced by portfolio re-allocations do not drive the excess returns
on dates t+ 3 through t+ 7.
Figure 1.3: Trading volume of IPSA and H&L’s announcements
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Table 1.10: Trading volume around new recommendations. OLS regression of yτ =
α +
∑10
s=−2 βsδEτ (s) + τ using daily data from 3Jan2011–30sep2016, where yτ is daily
volume of a stock market index, and δEτ (s) is an indicator function that equals 1 s days
after a new recommendation.
IPSA IGPA INTER-10
δE(−2) -0.040 -0.061 0.038
(0.079) (0.084) (0.096)
δE(−1) 0.057 0.029 0.127
(0.065) (0.071) (0.079)
δE(0) -0.005 -0.023 0.029
(0.077) (0.079) (0.077)
δE(1) -0.267 -0.080 -0.047
(0.202) (0.093) (0.111)
δE(2) -0.035 -0.051 -0.000
(0.115) (0.113) (0.141)
δE(3) -0.062 -0.063 -0.099
(0.063) (0.068) (0.084)
δE(4) -0.040 0.007 -0.037
(0.071) (0.084) (0.100)
δE(5) -0.100 -0.115 -0.030
(0.091) (0.097) (0.114)
δE(6) -0.079 -0.103 -0.065
(0.079) (0.078) (0.100)
δE(7) -0.037 -0.030 -0.014
(0.076) (0.083) (0.083)
δE(8) 0.009 -0.034 0.085
(0.068) (0.069) (0.070)
δE(9) -0.024 -0.043 -0.035
(0.088) (0.089) (0.110)
δE(10) 0.135 0.088 0.147
(0.114) (0.117) (0.132)
Obs. 1,436 1,436 1,436
R2 0.012 0.005 0.006
Adj. R2 0.003 -0.004 -0.003
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Intercept not reported
The question becomes: what does underlie these return patterns? Suggestive in-
sights come from decomposing the sample into early recommendations (recommen-
dations one to six) and later recommendations (recommendations seven onwards)—
as individual investors only began switching between pension portfolios in large
numbers beginning with the seventh recommendation (see Figure 1.1). We estimate
regressions of the form:
yτ = α +
0∑
s=−2
βsδEτ (s) + β1δEτ (1 : 2) + β2δEτ (3 : 7) + β3δEτ (8 : 10)
+
0∑
s=−2
φsγEτ (s) + φ1γEτ (1 : 2) + φ2γEτ (3 : 7) + φ3γEτ (8 : 10) + τ .
The δE indicators are active (taking on values of ±ρ) only for the first six recom-
mendations, and the γE indicators become active starting with the seventh recom-
mendation, and the notation is as before. Table 1.11 underscores that portfolio
reallocations do not underlie these excess returns. For early recommendations that
almost no investors acted on, there are large abnormal returns on days t+ 3 to t+ 7
of about 0.7-0.8% on stock market indexes and 0.5% on portfolio A. Thus, initially
investors would have benefited from following H&L’s advice. However, once large
numbers of investors began to follow H&L’s recommendations, the excess returns in
the stock market vanish: portfolio reallocations and market illiquidity do not drive
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the observed return patterns.23
Table 1.11: Recommendations and asset returns. OLS regression of yτ =
α +
∑0
s=−2 βsδEτ (s) + β1δEτ (1 : 2) + β2δEτ (3 : 7) + β3δEτ (8 : 10) +
∑0
s=−2 φsγEτ (s) +
φ1γEτ (1 : 2) +φ2γEτ (3 : 7) +φ3γEτ (8 : 10) + τ using daily data for the period 3Jan2011–
30Sep2016, where yτ is the daily return (in %) of a social security portfolio, stock market
index, exchange rate (foreign currency over CLP), or government bond.
Social Security Portfolios Stock Market Placebo
A A A E IPSA IPSA IPSA S&P500
δE(−2) 0.678*** 0.154 0.185 -0.027 1.160*** 0.453 0.561 0.645**
(0.115) (0.139) (0.134) (0.035) (0.333) (0.414) (0.364) (0.258)
δE(−1) 0.398** 0.056 0.062 -0.009 1.035*** 0.688* 0.587* 0.768***
(0.166) (0.105) (0.101) (0.050) (0.364) (0.358) (0.337) (0.280)
δE(0) 0.312 0.151 0.174 0.013 0.531 0.210 0.259 0.326
(0.200) (0.104) (0.113) (0.055) (0.443) (0.268) (0.268) (0.371)
δE(1 : 2) -0.059 -0.019 -0.030 0.006 -0.016 0.107 0.052 -0.318
(0.113) (0.073) (0.079) (0.049) (0.203) (0.171) (0.194) (0.384)
δE(3 : 7) 0.475** 0.198*** 0.208** -0.012 0.755** 0.441** 0.459*** 0.702**
(0.193) (0.076) (0.081) (0.020) (0.317) (0.215) (0.177) (0.354)
δE(8 : 10) 0.099 0.067 0.089 -0.120* -0.434 -0.641 -0.455 -0.020
(0.193) (0.096) (0.094) (0.063) (0.437) (0.424) (0.351) (0.526)
γE(−2) 0.410*** 0.242*** 0.266*** 0.021 0.621*** 0.255 0.291* 0.603**
(0.100) (0.091) (0.092) (0.019) (0.204) (0.186) (0.176) (0.252)
γE(−1) 0.758*** 0.244*** 0.269*** 0.004 1.055*** 0.402** 0.397** 1.130***
(0.127) (0.095) (0.095) (0.029) (0.211) (0.197) (0.193) (0.252)
γE(0) 0.242 0.192* 0.215** -0.021 0.583** 0.314* 0.417** 0.080
(0.174) (0.104) (0.108) (0.026) (0.246) (0.174) (0.185) (0.235)
γE(1 : 2) -0.055 0.002 -0.000 -0.011 -0.036 0.027 0.110 -0.275
(0.099) (0.066) (0.067) (0.014) (0.179) (0.157) (0.145) (0.175)
γE(3 : 7) 0.130** 0.076* 0.079* 0.013 0.072 0.009 0.011 0.148
(0.055) (0.042) (0.042) (0.009) (0.100) (0.083) (0.081) (0.101)
γE(8 : 10) -0.115* -0.082** -0.086** -0.005 -0.181 -0.117 -0.169 -0.162
(0.061) (0.038) (0.038) (0.011) (0.134) (0.113) (0.107) (0.134)
ACWI 0.417***
(0.021)
World 0.401***
(0.021)
Emerging Markets 0.487***
(0.030)
Latin America 0.353***
(0.020)
Observations 1,436 1,436 1,436 1,436 1,437 1,437 1,437 1,446
R2 0.058 0.503 0.486 0.019 0.056 0.363 0.391 0.037
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.498 0.481 0.011 0.048 0.357 0.385 0.029
Testing equality of before and after coefficients (p-value)
δE(−2) = γE(−2) 0.079 0.594 0.614 0.225 0.167 0.660 0.502 0.906
δE(−1) = γE(−1) 0.085 0.176 0.128 0.816 0.962 0.482 0.623 0.340
δE(0) = γE(0) 0.790 0.783 0.790 0.570 0.918 0.744 0.628 0.577
δE(1 : 2) = γE(1 : 2) 0.976 0.832 0.774 0.744 0.941 0.727 0.812 0.919
δE(3 : 7) = γE(3 : 7) 0.086 0.160 0.160 0.250 0.040 0.062 0.022 0.135
δE(8 : 10) = γE(8 : 10) 0.289 0.150 0.083 0.071 0.581 0.231 0.435 0.795
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Intercept not reported
Instead, following later recommendations, the market immediately responds with
announcement effects on stock market indexes of 0.5–0.6%. Thus, it appears that
at the outset H&L correctly anticipated the near-term performance of the risky
portfolio A. In turn, this seems to have led to a shared belief among individual
investors and the market that H&L’s recommendations contain valuable information.
As a result large numbers of individual investors started following H&L’s advice.
Paradoxically, though, because the market also comes to believe that H&L’s advice
has value, this information is immediately incorporated into portfolio valuations
and stock prices. Unfortunately for followers of H&L, it takes time to transfer
23A recent working paper (Da, Larrain, Sialm, and Tessada (2016)) also looks at H&L’s returns,
positing that trades by AFPs might be driving the return patterns. The absence of increased
trading volume in domestic stock markets in the days following recommendations indicates that
this premise is incorrect.
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investments between portfolios. Consequently, investors following H&L’s advice fail
to benefit from these announcement effects.
As a placebo test, the last column of Table 1.11 reports results using daily
returns of the S&P 500 index as the dependent variable, as returns on this index
are highly correlated with those on the domestic stock market and portfolio A. For
early recommendations, we expect results similar to those for the domestic stock
market indexes; but for later recommendations, we expect positive lagged returns
and no announcement effects. This is exactly what we find.
1.2.3 Do followers gain?
We next investigate whether investors benefit from following H&L’s advice. We
employ two approaches:
1. We use H&L’s payment records to compute returns for each follower starting
with the first announcement he could follow through the last announcement
before his subscription expired. We then determine whether the follower’s
return exceeded that from a buy-and-hold strategy for each feasible portfolio
over that period of time.
2. We compare the cumulative returns starting at each of the first twenty an-
nouncements through September 30, 2016 from (a) following H&L’s strategy
vs. (b) investing and then holding any given portfolio.
Because some investors must select from less risky portfolios due to their age or
gender, we divide followers into risk categories according to the riskiest portfolio
that they can choose. If age or gender is missing, or if the age when the account
was open is below eighteen, we drop the observation.24
Table 1.12 compares returns for each follower starting with the first announce-
ment he could follow through the last announcement before his subscription expired
with the analogous return from a buy-and-hold strategy for each (age and gender)
feasible portfolio over that period of time. The top panel reveals the percentage of
followers that obtained a higher return than they would have obtained from holding
an alternative (age and gender) feasible portfolio presuming that followers request
that investments be shifted as soon as a recommendation is received. Over 70%
obtained lower returns that those they would have received from investing in the
riskiest portfolio that they could choose, and over 90% earned worse returns than
those from holding the safe portfolio E. The table also plots the distribution of net
returns: the median is negative and a non-trivial fraction of followers earn a net
24 Of the 111,351 observations in H&L’s administrative records, about 22% do not have infor-
mation for gender or age, or has a starting age below eighteen. Results are robust to assigning risk
type A to the dropped observations.
30
return of -10% or worse; in contrast, those who outperformed the social security
portfolios, barely did so.
The bottom panel of Table 1.12 compares returns of followers if the pricing
convention were changed so that returns reflect prices at the moment a request
is made, rather than with a one day lag. Consistent with our regression results,
followers would have done far better if they could have benefitted from the stock
market announcement effect. Plausibly, this finding can reconcile why some indi-
viduals continued to follow H&L despite their poor actual performance—they may
not have recognized this poor performance.25 The complex pricing rules used by
AFPs to value portfolio transfers may make difficult for followers to realize that the
announcement effect is hurting them rather than helping them. We recall: following
a request to switch portfolios on day t− 1, when the AFP moves the money on day
t+ 3 (as is typical), the AFP uses the portfolio price on day t+ 1 to value the funds
being shifted, which is computed based on the day t prices of the underlying assets.
Table 1.13 provides even starker evidence. The table compares the return from
following H&L strategy with those from buying and holding each of the five portfo-
lios. The comparison considers an investor who starts following H&L at recommen-
dation k for k = 1, ..., 20 and continues to do so until September 30, 2016. That
is, we compare the return from beginning to follow H&L at different points in time
with all possible buy and hold strategies. Column t − 1 shows the return assum-
ing a follower acts the same day the recommendation is made. We see that with
the exception of the first recommendation, any other starting point is outperformed
by at least one the five portfolios, and, in almost all cases, H&L’s strategy ranks
last. Column t − 2 shows the analogous returns were investments transferred at
the exact moment when H&L made its recommendation at prices based on close
of that trading day—returns that H&L can highlight, and returns that an investor
would obtain if he could benefit from the announcement effect. For 9 of the first 14
recommendations, this return exceeds that from buying and holding any portfolio,
and for 15 of the first 20 recommendations, this return exceeds that from buying
and holding portfolio A, essentially reversing the true return pattern. Comparing
columns t−1 and t−2 reveals the impact of the announcement effect, which results
in investors buying portfolio A high, and selling it low, and the consequences for
cumulative returns.
Columns t − 3 and t − 4 show that a hypothetical investor who could have
acted on H&L’s advice two or three days before the recommendation was made
would have vastly outperformed any buy and hold strategy. This, of course, simply
reflects the market/portfolio returns that entered into H&L’s decision to change
recommendations. But, such returns raise the possibility that some investors may
25 In the next subsection we will show that this fact can only partially explain why so many
workers follow H&L. In particular, many followers know that H&L underperformed buy and hold
in the previous 12 months.
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Table 1.12: Percentage of followers by risk type that beat a Buy & Hold strategy for differ-
ent feasible portfolios. Followers are assumed to act immediately on all recommendations
while their subscription is active. The top panel reflects the existing pricing convention.
The bottom panel supposes that the pricing convention is changed so that returns reflect
prices at the moment a request is made, rather than with a one day lag.
Acting immediately
Risk type A B C
Benchmark A B C D E B C D E C D E
0.27 0.21 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.24 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.25 0.23 0.05
Distribution of net returns
Incorporating announcement effect
Risk type A B C
Benchmark A B C D E B C D E C D E
0.36 0.49 0.21 0.07 0.16 0.46 0.25 0.14 0.23 0.32 0.32 0.47
Distribution of net returns
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naively lump those returns in with the returns that they actually realize and conclude
that the performance of H&L is better than it actually was. The qualitative results
in Table 1.13 obviously hold if returns are adjusted by risk. Appendix C presents
the analogous table computed using the modified Sharpe ratio (Israelsen (2005)).
Table 1.13: Nominal cumulative return for H&L’s strategy and the five social secu-
rity portfolios starting with any of the first 20 recommendations until September 30,
2016. Column t−1: cumulative return for follower acting the day a recommendation
is made. Column t−j, j = 2, 3, 4: hypothetical cumulative return for a follower who
acts j days before a recommendation is made. Column t−2 captures the return that
would obtain were investments transferred as soon as a recommendation is made.
Starting Benchmark H&L
recomm. A B C D E t− 1 t− 2 t− 3 t− 4
1 0.399 0.393 0.461 0.484 0.514 0.525 0.632 0.805 0.932
2 0.535 0.480 0.504 0.485 0.460 0.470 0.573 0.737 0.858
3 0.541 0.483 0.509 0.492 0.472 0.476 0.553 0.706 0.790
4 0.483 0.438 0.474 0.462 0.440 0.444 0.519 0.669 0.749
5 0.390 0.367 0.420 0.430 0.433 0.354 0.429 0.565 0.620
6 0.458 0.410 0.438 0.428 0.409 0.331 0.407 0.541 0.596
7 0.443 0.399 0.426 0.419 0.402 0.318 0.413 0.545 0.595
8 0.466 0.414 0.435 0.424 0.403 0.318 0.415 0.546 0.592
9 0.472 0.422 0.439 0.418 0.388 0.324 0.419 0.545 0.584
10 0.360 0.337 0.377 0.380 0.376 0.312 0.403 0.523 0.560
11 0.349 0.327 0.361 0.362 0.355 0.302 0.389 0.484 0.512
12 0.342 0.326 0.348 0.337 0.329 0.277 0.359 0.451 0.478
13 0.345 0.329 0.346 0.330 0.314 0.279 0.351 0.435 0.448
14 0.339 0.322 0.341 0.326 0.312 0.277 0.347 0.432 0.446
15 0.277 0.271 0.286 0.269 0.260 0.217 0.252 0.310 0.312
16 0.216 0.221 0.245 0.241 0.247 0.205 0.241 0.298 0.301
17 0.130 0.142 0.168 0.174 0.182 0.142 0.175 0.229 0.230
18 0.097 0.113 0.140 0.149 0.160 0.120 0.153 0.211 0.214
19 0.123 0.129 0.146 0.147 0.150 0.111 0.142 0.196 0.199
20 0.123 0.125 0.135 0.136 0.135 0.110 0.128 0.156 0.154
This evidence is striking given that H&L only had 54 followers at the time of the
first announcement, and did not attract new clients until announcement five (see the
top panel of Figure 1.4, which plots the matrix of clients according to the first and
last announcement they could follow according to their payment records).26 This
figure shows that an important part of H&L’s subscribers were still active in the
last announcement in our sample, and many have been following for over a year.
The bottom panel of Figure 1.4 reveals that over halpf of H&L customers renew
their membership, and so presumably choose to continue following recommendations
despite the poor realized returns from doing so. This leads us to ask: Why do
followers act on H&L’s recommendations? Are they aware of their performance? We
investigate these questions next, presenting results from a survey of H&L clients.
26 Our sample features 35 announcements, but the matrix in Figure 1.4 has 36 rows and columns
because some followers joined after the last announcement (or their membership has not expired).
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Figure 1.4: Membership length of H&L followers according to their payment records.
The top figure shows the heat map of the matrix with the first and last announce-
ment while the account was active for each follower. The bottom table shows the
distribution of followers according to the length of their membership in years, and
we decompose each category in whether they are active or inactive (expired) as of
September 30, 2016.
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First recommendation
1 to 1000 1,001 to 2,000 2,001 to 3,000
3,001 to 4,000 4,001 to 5,000 5,001 and more
Distribution of membership length
Number of followers Inactive Active
One year or less 53,037 29,594 23,433
47% 56% 44%
Between 1 and 2 years 7,862 3,686 4,176
7% 47% 53%
Between 2 and 3 years 17,022 8,267 8,755
15% 49% 51%
Between 3 and 4 years 18,494 5,469 13,025
16% 30% 70%
More than 4 years 15,833 716 15,117
14% 5% 95%
Total 112,248 47,732 64,516
100% 43% 57%
1.2.4 Characterizing followers
Table 1.3 reveals that paid and second-hand followers of H&L have over twice the
savings of the average investor, consistent with Fuentes, Searle, and Villatoro (2013)
who find that active investors in the system have higher savings than those who do
not change portfolio choices. To glean more insights, we conducted a survey during
October and November 2016 of followers of H&L and other advisers providing a
similar service. We invited them to distribute the survey to followers by email.
Appendix A lists the questions. We also launched our survey in Facebook. The
Facebook post was randomly displayed to stratified segments of adults in Chile
according to age and gender. We now compare the results of our survey with the
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EPS.
The vast majority of respondents—almost 87%—claim to be current followers of
H&L (see Table 1.18 in appendix B), so our analysis focuses on this sub-population.
We contrast these respondents with the 68% of respondents from the 2015 EPS who
claim to be members of the AFP system. We divide AFP members into two groups
according to whether they claim to know which portfolio(s) they are holding. About
77% of AFP members do not know their portfolio (see Table 1.19 in appendix B). We
label these groups AFP DNK if do not know the portfolio, and AFP otherwise. Table
1.14 provides some demographics of these groups. Striking differences appear when
comparing education and income: H&L followers are far more educated (almost 75%
have university degrees vs. 36% for AFP members who know their portfolios, and
only 14% for those who do not), they have incomes that are several multiples of
the other two groups, and they are more than twice as likely to hold savings other
than mandatory savings. These three findings are consistent with Fuentes, Searle,
and Villatoro (2013).27 The three groups do not differ substantially in risk aversion.
Interestingly, a smaller proportion of followers self-describe themselves as having a
good or very good financial knowledge.
Greater savings and income, and higher education suggest that followers are more
sophisticated than typical members of the other two groups. Our survey features two
questions pertaining to financial sophistication. These questions belong to a group
of “sophisticated” questions designed by the United States Health and Retirement
Study (HRS) to identify knowledge of key financial concepts (Behrman, Mitchell,
Soo, and Bravo (2012)). These two questions were also asked in the 2009 and
2012 EPS. One question is a TRUE/FALSE question about risk diversification; and
the other question asked respondents to compute a two-period compound interest
problem. We coded answers as correct or incorrect. Table 1.15 reveals that 85%
of followers answered the diversification question correctly, but non-followers did
no better than would be expected by chance. The question related to compound
interest is even more telling: 64% of followers answer the question correctly versus
only 3-5% of non-followers. In sum, followers are very financially sophisticated,
whereas the typical investor is quite unsophisticated.
The fact that followers are sophisticated does not ensure that they are aware of
the poor performance of H&L’s strategy. To test their awareness we had respondents
rank portfolios A, C, E and their own savings in terms of returns over the past
twelve months. The survey was “open” from October to November 2016; Figure 1.5
plots these twelve month returns starting on the 30th September until the end of
November. The figure shows that the ranks of portfolios A, C and E do not change
over this period, but the rank of H&L’s strategy varies depending on the specific
day agents used to compute the ranking. Therefore, we only compare the relative
27 Fuentes, Searle, and Villatoro (2013) provide evidence about the characteristics of active
members of the system who request transfers among the different portfolios between 2008–2013.
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Table 1.14: Demographics from our survey and the 2015 EPS. Table entries represent
percent of observations in that category.
Gender
Male Female
H&L 79.3 20.7
AFP 61.4 38.6
AFP DNK 51.8 48.2
Hold other savings
Yes No
H&L 69.4 30.6
AFP 32.4 67.6
AFP DNK 19 81
Age
18-34 35-54 55-64 65+
H&L 25.6 57.2 15 2.3
AFP 29.2 58.1 10.5 2.3
AFP DNK 35.9 43.9 12 8.1
Income (USD)
500 500-1,000 1,000-2,000 2,001+
H&L 2.5 11.6 37.3 48.5
AFP 31.8 32.2 27.6 8.5
AFP DNK 65.9 25.5 7.3 1.3
Education
Primary Secondary Tech. Degree Uni. Degree Postgraduate
H&L 0 4 21.7 56.5 17.8
AFP 3.7 40.1 20.9 30.1 5.2
AFP DNK 19.6 53.6 13.2 12.7 1
Financial knowledge – self perception (2012 EPS)
Very bad Bad Intermediate Good Very good
H&L 6.7 28.2 53.5 10.7 0.9
AFP 6.8 16.1 47.7 24.9 4.6
AFP DNK 16.9 29.2 41.8 11.1 1
Risk aversion (2012 EPS)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
H&L 2.45 1.76 3.57 5.93 6.81 23.44 15.39 20.78 14.12 2.39 3.38
AFP 5.01 1.86 2.77 5.46 6.08 17.9 12.62 13.6 14.24 8.75 11.71
AFP DNK 7.81 4.39 6.13 6.98 7.12 17.39 11.18 11.65 10.71 4.59 12.05
Table 1.15: Percent of correct answers to questions related to financial sophistica-
tion.
Risk diversification Compound interest
H&L followers 85% 64%
AFP 55% 5%
AFP DNK 48% 3%
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rank of their own savings with respect to portfolio E.
Figure 1.5: Twelve month return during survey period for each portfolio and H&L’s
strategy.
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Using only observations of individuals who have been following H&L for over a
year, we divide respondents who ranked portfolios into groups. The “full-ranking”
group consists of those who ranked all three portfolios and their own savings. We
divide those who only give a partial ranking into three groups: partial ranking group
1 consists of those who ranked portfolio E, their own portfolio, and either A or C.
Partial ranking group 2 consists of those who provided rankings for at least two
portfolios but failed to provide a ranking for their own savings. Partial ranking
group 3 consists of those who ranked portfolio E and their own savings only. About
40% of followers do not provide rankings, and about 9% only give his own ranking
and a portfolio other than E, and are omitted.
Table 1.16 shows that those who rank portfolio returns tend to be well informed—
over 60% rank the returns on portfolios A, C and E correctly, and little over half
correctly recognize that the return on the safe portfolio E exceeded the return from
following H&L’s strategy28 and over 75% of those giving a response correctly assessed
that the real return on their savings from following H&L’s strategy in the past twelve
months was between 0 and 4%. In sum, most investors have good ideas of the actual
return that they obtained, and a non-trivial majority of followers pay extensive
attention to the relative performance of different pension portfolios. Some investors
overestimate the performance of H&L’s strategy relative to the safe portfolio E, but
even then a majority get this ordering right.
Thus, we have documented that (1) followers are highly financially sophisticated—
far more so than the average investor—and they have a lot more at stake, (2) most
28 This question is demanding—a reader should reflect on how the 12-month return on their own
portfolio ranked vis a` vis the S&P 500 or MSCI World Index.
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Table 1.16: Portfolios ranking and H&L relative performance.
Group
Sample size (A <C <E) (H&L <E)
Num. respondents Correct answers Correct answers
Full ranking 2,964 1,693 1,489
57% 50%
Partial ranking 1 300 197 191
66% 64%
Partial ranking 2 1,083 702
65%
Partial ranking 3 89 50
56%
Respondents are classified into four groups: (i) Full ranking, those who ranked all portfolios including their own
savings; (ii) Partial ranking 1 have rankings for portfolio E, their own portfolio and either A or C; (iii) Partial
ranking 2 have rankings for at least two portfolios but not for their own savings; (iv) Partial ranking 3 have rankings
for portfolio E and their own savings only.
Table 1.17: Real returns on own savings over the previous 12 months. Actual return
on H&L’s strategy fluctuated between 0 and 4%.
Group Num. of Less than Between Higher% Don’t know /
respondents 0% 0 and 4% than 4% No Response
Full ranking 1,859 37 1,202 361 259
1.9% 64.7% 19.4% 13.9%
Partial ranking 1 178 1 122 33 22
1% 69% 19% 12%
Partial ranking 2 676 13 435 129 99
2% 64% 19% 15%
Partial ranking 3 60 0 45 8 7
0% 75% 13% 12%
No ranking 1,852 39 953 267 593
2% 52% 14% 32%
Respondents are classified into four groups: (i) Full ranking, those who ranked all portfolios including their own
savings; (ii) Partial ranking 1 have rankings for portfolio E, their own portfolio and either A or C; (iii) Partial
ranking 2 have rankings for at least two portfolios but not for their own savings; (iv) Partial ranking 3 have rankings
for portfolio E and their own savings only.
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followers were harmed by following H&L, and (3) a majority of followers is aware
of the bad performance. Why then do investors follow H&L? Our survey asks re-
spondents to rank five possible reasons for why they follow their current advisor.29
Figure 1.6 presents a puzzle: it reveals that current H&L followers indicate that the
most important reasons for following H&L are: higher returns, loss minimization
and trust...
Of course, inverting the standard investment caveat, past bad performance is no
guarantee of future bad performance. The fact that most respondents cite trust in
H&L as a key reason for following him, may indicate that they believe that H&L
offers them a higher expected return, or that they value having someone “looking
after” their savings for them. Moreover, some followers appear to over-estimate
relative returns of H&L, possibly due to the complex pricing rules used by AFPs
to value transferred funds, and some may also confuse the good performance of
a portfolio just prior to H&L’s recommendation. The bottom line remains that
understanding how and why individuals allocate pension investments as they do is
germane not only to the Chilean Social Security system, but to retirement savings
everywhere.
Figure 1.6: Why do current followers follow H&L?
0 1 2 3 4 5
Importance level
Too many people follow H&L
Friend/Relative recommendation
Trust more on H&L than AFP
Minimise loss
Higher returns
1.3 Conclusion
We document the massive effects that portfolio recommendations by the pension
advisory service H&L have had on pension investments by individuals, and the
consequences for the Chilean stock market. Investors have come to believe that
H&L’s recommendations contain information with predictive value—leading to pen-
sion transfers that amount to as much as 25% of total portfolio holdings and 1.5% of
29 Only a few respondents selected an “other” option, and its average importance level is low.
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GDP. Prior to investors following this advice in large numbers, investors could have
benefited from it; but once investors started following H&L’s advice, stock prices
responded before investors could reallocate pension investments in time to benefit.
As a result, pension investors are harmed by following H&L’s advice; most investors
would have done better to stick with whatever pension position they had at the
outset.
We establish that H&L bases recommendations on the immediate past perfor-
mances of the Chilean stock market—recommending riskier portfolios after the mar-
ket rises, and recommending safer portfolios after it falls. The extreme short-run
nature of the recommendation model means that others cannot forecast and fron-
trun H&L’s advice; consistent with this, we do not observe abnormal portfolio flows
or stock volume before new recommendations.
Individuals following H&L have high incomes and are highly educated and finan-
cially sophisticated, especially relative to non-followers. Moreover, followers have a
good understanding of the relative performances of different portfolios, albeit mod-
estly over-estimating the returns from following H&L. Remarkably, despite evidence
of poor past performance, the key reasons that individuals give for following H&L
are: high returns, minimize risk and trust.
Our findings suggest care in the design of “privatized” social security. “Priva-
tized” systems seek to align individual investments with risk attitudes, while avoid-
ing shortfalls in savings due to bad investment choices or moral hazard by invest-
ment advisors. One way to do this is to limit the set of investment alternatives. We
show that even with sharp limitations, sophisticated pension investors can still be
harmed. Our analysis also highlights a potentially adverse consequence of limited
choice sets. With few investment alternatives, common information arrival—here
taking the form of portfolio recommendations by H&L—can result in massive portfo-
lio reallocations. In Chile, these reallocations did not overwhelm liquidity provision
because AFPs can allocate them to liquid foreign equity markets, avoiding volume
surges in the Chilean stock market. This might not be possible for savings plans
with greater exposure to domestic equity markets.
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Appendix
1.A Survey questions
1. Do you currently follow the recommendation of an adviser to manage your
social security savings?
2. Currently do you follow any of the following advisers in social media? If Yes
in 1:
3. When did you start following the recommendations of your current adviser?
4. Why do you follow the announcements of your current adviser?
5. In the last twelve months, what is the return on your savings?
6. Rank portfolios A, C, E and your own savings in terms of returns in the last
twelve months
7. How much time did it pass since you first heard about your current adviser
and when you started following the recommendations?
8. Usually, how fast do you act upon recommendations?
9. Did you follow the recommendations of another adviser before? If No in 1:
10. What is the return on your savings in the last twelve months?
11. Rank portfolios A, C, E in terms of returns in the last twelve months
12. Are mandatory savings your main source of savings for retirement?
13. Did you follow the recommendations of another adviser before? For everyone:
14. Gender
15. Education
16. Age
17. Income (monthly individual income)
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18. Where do you live?
19. Generally, how is your knowledge on financial issues?
20. In a scale from 0 to 10, how risk averse are you? (where 0 is not willing to
take any risk)
21. True or false: buying share of a single firm is less risky compared to buying,
with the same money, shares of different companies.
22. Let’s say you have 200 in a savings account. The account pays 10% interest
rate per year. How much do you have after two years?
23. Do you have voluntary savings?
1.B EPS and survey samples
This appendix reports sample statistics for followers and members of the AFP sys-
tem. Table 1.18 reports the number of observations in our survey, and the number
of observations in the different EPS. Table 1.19 decomposes the observations used
in our analysis.
Table 1.18: Survey observation numbers by method of collection
Own survey EPS† survey
Source Obs. Source Obs. Obs.(iw)
H&L email list 9,373 EPS 2015 16,906 13,560,981
Other advisors 118 EPS 2012 15,998 12,718,525
Facebook 547 EPS 2009 14,463 12,765,015
† The Obs. (iw) column refers to the expanded sample by “importance weights” provided in the EPS.
Table 1.19: Sample selection
Source Sample size Per cent of total N
Our survey current H&L followers 8,703 86.7
EPS 2015 in AFP system 9,253,512 68.2
Know portfolio 2,090,012 22.5
Don’t know portfolio 7,163,500 77.5
EPS 2012 in AFP system 8,431,177 66.3
Know portfolio 2,577,376 30.5
Don’t know portfolio 5,853,801 69.5
EPS 2009 in AFP system 8,288,982 64.9
Know portfolio 2,905,235 35.0
Don’t know portfolio 5,383,747 65.0
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1.C Modified Sharpe ratio
In this appendix we show the modified Sharpe ratio (Israelsen (2005)) for H&L’s
strategy and for each portfolios besides portfolio E. We use Portfolio E as the risk
free portfolio when calculating the modified Sharpe ratio. The original Sharpe ratio
is not valid when the excess return is negative. The modified ratio corrects this.
As Table 1.13 reports, portfolio E yields the highest return for the period analyzed.
Interpretations of the modified ratio are similar to those of the original Sharpe ratio:
a higher ratio reveals a higher return after controlling for risk.
Let ER be the average of the daily excess return of portfolio X relative to portfolio
E, and SD the standard deviation of the daily excess return. The modified Sharpe
ratio is defined as:
Modified Sharpe ratio =
ER
SDER/abs ER
, (1.1)
where abs ER is the absolute value of ER. From equation (1.1) we see that if ER is
positive then the Sharpe ratio and the modified version coincide. If ER is negative
then the exponent in the denominator is -1, and so the modified Sharpe ratio becomes
the product of ER and SD, instead of their ratio.
The results presented in Table 1.20 are obtained adjusting equation (1.1) in two
ways: first we multiply the ratio by 252, the (average) number of trading days in a
year; and second, because both ER and SD are close to zero, when ER is negative
the ratio becomes very small, therefore we multiply negative entries by 100,000 so
that scales are similar.
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Table 1.20: Modified Sharpe Ratios for H&L’s strategy and social security portfolios
A, B, C & D starting with any of the first 20 recommendations until September 30,
2016. Column t − 1: modified Sharpe ratio if a follower acts the day a recommen-
dation is made. Column t− j for j = 2, 3, 4: modified Sharpe ratio if follower acts
j days before a recommendation is made.
Starting Benchmark H&L
recomm. A B C D t− 1 t− 2 t− 3 t− 4
1 -6.46 -5.65 -1.59 -0.48 0.83 4.64 9.76 12.75
2 2.70 1.24 2.97 3.21 0.85 4.71 9.88 12.90
3 2.63 0.88 2.63 2.73 0.58 3.89 9.40 11.97
4 1.97 0.33 2.62 3.22 0.58 3.92 9.59 12.09
5 -1.86 -3.02 -0.30 -0.03 -3.45 0.21 6.27 8.26
6 2.38 0.49 2.54 3.07 -3.72 0.33 6.52 8.61
7 2.13 0.25 2.18 2.76 -4.05 0.99 7.29 9.14
8 2.95 1.01 2.86 3.57 -4.13 1.05 7.34 9.04
9 3.81 2.24 4.52 5.06 -3.13 2.19 8.36 9.80
10 -0.14 -2.06 0.38 0.93 -3.55 2.08 8.33 9.77
11 0.39 -1.52 0.87 1.50 -3.14 2.67 8.15 9.36
12 1.30 0.26 2.40 2.04 -3.57 2.56 8.30 9.54
13 2.21 1.50 3.87 3.63 -2.35 3.13 8.57 9.10
14 2.08 1.21 3.76 3.54 -2.42 3.11 8.65 9.23
15 1.67 1.40 3.82 2.72 -3.60 -0.36 4.91 5.01
16 -3.25 -2.30 0.01 -0.20 -3.85 -0.18 5.14 5.33
17 -8.74 -5.08 -1.11 -0.34 -4.95 -0.40 5.52 5.53
18 -11.53 -6.29 -1.67 -0.46 -5.09 -0.28 6.09 6.25
19 -4.43 -2.81 -0.26 -0.12 -5.65 -0.69 6.01 6.32
20 -1.43 -1.22 0.23 0.57 -3.77 -0.73 3.29 3.02
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Chapter 2
The social value of information in
economies with mandatory savings
2.1 Introduction
We study the value of information in a stochastic pure exchange economy where all
agents trade assets in financial markets to reallocate risk and a subset of those agents
face a mandatory savings constraint. In their 2008 book, Barr and P. Diamond write
about what they call the “aging crisis”. The authors discuss how reductions in
mortality, fertility and lower labor force participation of older men in recent decades
have increased pension costs to unsustainable levels in many countries. Accordingly,
countries have responded by introducing changes to their pension systems. One
such change has been the development of mandatory fully funded individual savings
accounts, as in the famous case in Chile in 1981.
In economies with mandatory individual savings the government may give con-
sumers the possibility to decide where to invest their savings. In the literature on the
design of such systems, information is considered as a key input in the consumer’s
decision making process. This is because not only these systems involve complicated
rules but also due to the widespread financial illiteracy among consumers in many
countries. Thus “more” information is normally viewed as desirable.
However there is another channel through which information can have an effect
on welfare: information release may affect prices. Surprisingly, to the best of our
knowledge, this channel has been largely ignored in the literature on pensions even
though the theoretical literature suggests that the welfare effects on prices might be
ambiguous and dependent on the asset structure. Chapter 1 shows how the release of
information has led to massive coordinated movements between the available social
security portfolios in Chile, affecting the prices of the social security portfolio, the
domestic stock market and other assets. Thus the release of new information appears
to be affecting also those who did not act upon the new information and those outside
the pension system. So, it is key to understand the welfare effect of information-
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driven price changes when some agents face mandatory savings constraints.
We consider a two-period exchange economy with two agents, a single consump-
tion good and uncertainty about the state of nature in period 1. There are two
states of nature that realise in period 1 but no aggregate uncertainty. In period
zero, agents trade two Arrow securities and a risk-free bond.1 One of the agents
faces a mandatory savings constraint modelled as lower bound on the value of the
holdings of the risk-free bond, and short-sale constraints on the other assets. We
call her the constrained agent. The other agent is unconstrained.2 We call her the
unconstrained agent. We model an information structure as signals that lead agents
to update their common prior belief over the states of nature via Bayes’ rule.
We study the welfare effects caused by information that arrives before agents
trade in financial markets. In particular, we look for an information structure that
allows a benevolent planner to obtain a Pareto improvement relative to the equi-
librium in which agents do not have access to information before trading, the un-
informative equilibrium hereafter. Throughout our analysis we assume the Planner
faces the same constraints as the agents in terms of the available assets, information,
and savings constraints. We consider two welfare notions depending on whether one
evaluates allocations ex-ante or ex-post, i.e. before or after observing the signal.
In the absence of the savings and short-sell constraints, the existing assets would
allow the agents to generate any desirable future consumption vector. However, the
savings constraints and short-sale constraints prevent the equilibrium from being
fully Pareto efficient when they are binding. Since the savings constraint is modeled
as a lower bound on the value of the holdings of the risk-free bond, it depends on the
equilibrium (gross) interest rate. Different information structures lead to different
posteriors and thus result in different equilibrium prices and, possibly, different
interest rate. Therefore changes in information can shift the lower bound on the
holdings of the risk-free bond. If the savings constraint is relaxed, the Planner
can access allocations that are Pareto superior, but that were not feasible at the
uninformative equilibrium interest rate.
When studying the existence of ex-post improvements, i.e. Pareto improvements
under each signal, we show that an ex-post improvement exists if and only if the
savings constraint is relaxed under every signal. We begin our analysis by asking if
there exists an alternative allocation and a posterior different to the common prior
such that the alternative allocation satisfies the savings constraint at the initial
equilibrium prices, and that Pareto dominates the uninformative equilibrium allo-
1We consider mandatory savings in a redundant assets to mimic how these type of social security
systems work in practice.
2We work with an unconstrained agent because that is what we observe in the Chilean case.
Only formal workers are force to save. If we were to assume that both agents have mandatory
savings constraints, but the unconstrained agent were completely free to choose the Arrow-Debreu
securities, then we would need to have the bond in positive net supply, but we expect all the result
to hold in such a case.
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cation when utilities are computed using the new posterior. The answer is no. For
every alternative posterior, the allocations that Pareto dominate the uninformative
equilibrium allocation are outside the constrained feasible set of the uninformative
equilibrium. All the Pareto superior allocations violate the savings constraint at
initial equilibrium prices. Thus ex-post constrained Pareto improvement exist if
and only if the constraint set of the Planner is enlarged for every signal.
To study ex-ante improvements, i.e. Pareto improvements in expected value, we
define the Pareto frontier as the maximum utility the constrained agent can attain
in the constrained feasible set as a function of her posterior belief and the utility
of the unconstrained agent. We relate the existence of ex-ante improvements to the
concavity of the Pareto frontier. We show that there exist ex-ante improvements if
and only if the concavification of the Pareto frontier evaluated at the prior belief
and the uninformative equilibrium utility level for the unconstrained agent lies above
the uninformative equilibrium utility for constrained agent, i.e. the Pareto frontier
evaluated at that point.
The Pareto frontier fails to be concave in beliefs and the utility of the uncon-
strained agent under general conditions. In the simple case where the savings con-
straint does not prevent full consumption smoothing across states, the objective
function defining the Pareto frontier is independent of the posterior. Therefore the
posterior only affects the Pareto frontier through its effect on the equilibrium inter-
est rate and, therefore, on the constrained feasible set. Thus if prices do not change
with changes in information it is not possible to obtain ex-ante improvements. Con-
sequently, changes in prices are a necessary condition for the existence of ex-ante
improvements.
We show there exist a threshold on the posteriors such that equilibria are first
best if and only if the posterior is weakly above that threshold. Since there is no
aggregate uncertainty, then the gross interest rate is equal to one in every first
best equilibria. Fixing the utility of the unconstrained agent, this means that the
constrained feasible set, and thus the Pareto frontier, is constant for posteriors above
the threshold. For posteriors below the threshold, the savings constraint is binding in
equilibrium and the equilibrium interest rate is strictly less than one, as equilibrium
prices must induce the unconstrained agent to increase her consumption in period
zero. If the common prior is below the threshold, then the constrained feasible set
in the uninformative equilibrium contains the constrained feasible set for posteriors
above the threshold. This implies that the Pareto frontier at the uninformative
equilibrium attains a higher value relative to the constant value to the right of the
threshold.
Following Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), we say a distribution of posteriors
is Bayes’ plausible if the expected posterior is equal to the prior. If the common
prior is below the threshold, then for any Bayes’ plausible distribution of posteriors
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with support equal to the common prior and a posterior to right of the threshold,
the expected value of the Pareto frontier is greater than the Pareto frontier at the
threshold. Consequently, the frontier fails to be concave in the posterior belief.
Finally, we show that there exist information structures that allow the Planner
to obtain ex-ante improvements, i.e. we show that the concavification of the Pareto
frontier lies above the Pareto frontier when evaluated at the prior and the initial
utility for the unconstrained agent. To show existence of ex-ante improvements we
keep the utility of the constrained agent fixed at the uninformative equilibrium level
for every posterior. We fix a support for the posteriors and we look for the prob-
abilities of the posteriors that satisfy Bayes’ plausibility. Then we ask what are
the probabilities (of the posteriors) that keep the constrained agent indifferent with
respect to the initial equilibrium. We show that if the prior is close to the afore-
mentioned threshold, the Bayes’ plausible probabilities differ from the probabilities
that keep the constrained agent indifferent. In particular, the constrained agent is
better off relative to the uninformative equilibrium and as the unconstrained agent
is indifferent by construction, we obtain an ex-ante improvement.
Our work is related to a large literature that analyze the effect of public informa-
tion in two-periods competitive economies with homogeneous beliefs and complete
markets to share risk.3 In a seminal paper Hirshleifer (1971) considers a situation
where initially uninformed agents are revealed the true state of the world before
trading and, therefore, no risk sharing trade that benefits all agents is possible.
Initially uninformed traders cannot all be made better off even if the new infor-
mation that is revealed before trading is only partially revealing. Marshall (1974)
showed that the contract curve is independent of the posteriors when beliefs are
homogeneous (and markets are complete), therefore if the equilibrium without in-
formation lies in the contract curve, then it also belongs to the contract curve for
every vector of posteriors. Thus there are no ex-post improvements. In the special
case where initial endowments are an equilibrium in the economy without informa-
tion, he showed that changes in information cannot reduce the ex-ante utility of
any agent, as they can always stand pat and do not act upon the new informa-
tion, nor increase agents’ ex-ante utility. When endowments are not an equilibrium
without information, he argued that public information cannot obtain Pareto im-
provements. This result, closely related to the Sunspot theorem by Cass and Shell
(1983), was formally proved by Hakansson, Kunkel, and Ohlson (1982) who gave a
set of sufficient and necessary conditions for public information to have social value
in pure exchange economies under uncertainty. Full Pareto efficiency of the initial
equilibrium is a sufficient condition for public information to be of no social value.
When prior beliefs are heterogeneous, Marshall (1974) gave an early example
that public information can have social value. Ng (1977) showed that when initial
3With the exception of Maurer and Tran (2016), this literature do not consider markets that
are open before signals arrive.
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endowments are an equilibrium in the economy without information, then the arrival
of information makes some individual better off and no individual worse off. This
follows directly from the fact that agents can always decide not to trade. If beliefs
are heterogeneous, new information will make individuals willing to trade, hence
they cannot be worse off. He also showed that when initial endowments are not
an equilibrium in the economy without information, if prices are the same in the
economies with and without information, then the equilibrium with information
represents an ex-ante constrained Pareto improvement when posteriors coincide after
the release of information. The results follows from a standard revealed preference
argument.4
Recently, Maurer and Tran (2016) study the value of public information in an
economy with multiple consumption and trading dates. They show that when beliefs
are heterogeneous, the Hirshleifer effect is reversed if information arrives before the
first round of trading. This result holds when agents anticipate small benefits from
risk sharing and large benefits from intertemporal consumption smoothing.
Gottardi and Rahi (2014) consider the case of a pure exchange economy with
one good, two periods and incomplete markets. They show that ex-post Pareto
improvements can be attained for any change in information, by adjusting agents’
asset holdings to the new information.5 However when comparing different equi-
libria they show that the overall effect on welfare can go in any direction. The
difference lies in an additional welfare effect that arises due to the adjustment in
equilibrium prices. They conclude that competitive markets typically do not deal
with changes in information in a way that is welfare-improving even though it is
feasible to do so.6 In contrast, in our model ex-post improvements are only possible
under special conditions. The uninformative equilibrium is not ex-post constrained
Pareto efficient if and only if the uninformative equilibrium interest rate is greater
than the equilibrium interest rate of all the signals of the informative information
structure.
From a methodological point of view, this paper is also related to the literature
on Bayesian persuasion. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) study a symmetric infor-
mation model where two players, a sender and a receiver, interact. The sender can
4In his analysis, Ng (1977) uses the value of optimization to measure changes in welfare. That
is, he evaluate different allocations at the new posteriors induced by the new information, but he
fails to integrate across all the signals.
5Since the condition for constrained Pareto optimally of equilibria can be characterized in terms
of the equality of the marginal rate of substitution between assets and present consumption for all
agents (P. A. Diamond, 1967), it typically depends on the posterior of the agents. If one keeps
the allocation fixed and change the posteriors, nothing ensures that the condition for constrained
Pareto optimality holds for the new posteriors.
6They relate their analysis to the Hishleifer effect and the Blackwell effect. The former effect
follows from the example by Hirshleifer (1971) and it is related to how information affects welfare
through the change in equilibrium prices. The latter effect makes reference to Blackwell (1951),
who showed that agents can hedge risk more efficiently by adjusting their portfolios on the new
information.
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send signals to the receiver, whom upon observing the signal takes an action that
affects the payoff of both agents. The authors show that the sender can send signals
that result in the receiver taking an action that gives the sender higher expected
utility, relative to the action taken based on the prior, if and only if the concavifi-
cation of the sender’s expected utility lies above the expected utility function when
evaluated at the action the receiver takes under his prior. Thus we can relate our
analysis for a competitive economy to the literature on Bayesian persuasion. We
can think of the Planner as the sender, whose payoff function is given by the Pareto
frontier. The agents play the role of the receiver. They observe the signal sent
by the Planner and take an action, their excess demand, to maximize their payoff,
taking prices as given. These actions affect the Planner’s payoff as they determine
equilibrium prices and the constrained feasible set.
In the next section we formally introduce our model. In section three we define
an equilibrium in our economy. In section four we relate changes in formation and
welfare, and in the next two sections we study ex-post and ex-ante improvements.
We finish with conclusions in section seven. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2.2 The model
There are two periods, 0 and 1, and a single consumption good. Uncertainty, which
is resolved at period 1, is described by S = 2 states of the world.
The economy is populated by H = 2 agents indexed by h. A consumption plan
for agent h is given by xh =
(
xh0 , x
h
1 , x
h
2
)
. Agent h has endowments wh = (wh0 , w
h
1 , w
h
2 )
where wh0 > 0 is agent h’s endowment in period 0 and w
h
s > 0 is agent h’s endowment
in state s = 1, 2. Endowments are such that
∑
hw
h
s = w for s = 0, 1, 2.
Agents’ common belief about the probability of state one is denoted by pi ∈ [0, 1].
Both agents have utility functions V (xh, pi) : R3+× [0, 1] 7→ R that can be represented
as a time-separable expected utility function with Bernoulli function v : R+ 7→ R.
That is, for every consumption plan xh,
V (xh, pi) = v(xh0) + piv(x
h
1) + (1− pi)v(xh2).
We assume that v is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly
concave, and that limxhs→0 v
′(xhs ) = ∞, where v′ denotes the first derivative of v
with respect to its argument.
2.2.1 Financial markets
There are L = 3 securities that are traded in a competitive market at period 0. The
payoffs of these assets are in units of the consumption good in period 1. Assets 1
and 2 are Arrow-Debreu securities while asset 3 is a risk free bond paying one unit
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of the consumption good in all states. Let
Φ =
(
1 0 1
0 1 1
)
,
be the payoff matrix, where the element (s, l) of Φ is the payoff of asset l in state s.
Let q = (q0, . . . , q3) ∈ R4++ be the vector of period 0 prices, where q0 is the
price of the consumption good and ql is the price of asset l = 1, 2, 3, and let z
h =
(zh1 , z
h
2 , z
h
3 ) ∈ R3 be agent h’s vector of asset holdings. We say a consumption plan
xh can by financed at (q, wh) by a portfolio zh if:
q0x
h
0 +
∑
s
qsz
h
s = q0w
h
0 ,
xhs = w
h
s + z
h
s + z
h
3 ,∀s = 1, 2.
One of the two agents living in this economy faces a mandatory savings con-
straint. Let’s call her agent c (for constrained). Agent c’s mandatory savings con-
straint is such that the value of her holdings of asset three have to satisfy:
q3z
c
3 ≥ q0θ3, (2.1)
where θ3 > 0 is an exogenous parameter. The savings constraint on asset three
implies that she has a lower bound on the value of her holdings of the risk free
bond, and this lower bound depends on equilibrium prices.
In addition to the mandatory savings constraint, agent c faces short-sale con-
straint on assets one and two. That is, her holdings of assets one and two have to
satisfy:
zcl ≥ θl, (2.2)
with θl ≤ 0 an exogenous constant for l = 1, 2. Short-sale constraints are needed
in order to have equilibria where the savings constraint is binding. If there were no
short-sale constraints, then agent c could undo the savings constraint (2.1) as she
could generate any date 1 consumption plan in R2+ with the existing assets. In that
case any equilibrium would be fully Pareto optimal.7 The other agent, agent u (for
unconstrained), faces no constraints besides the usual budget constraint.
7An alternative approach, used in a previous version of this chapter, is to assume that the
government can target agents’ savings directly, i.e. we could assume the government imposes a
lower bound on total savings. If this lower bound depends on equilibrium prices all the result in
the chapter hold.
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2.2.2 Information
Prior to trading agents observe a public signal possibly correlated with the state of
the world s. We fix a finite set of signal realizations Y = (y1, y2, y3).8 Once signal
yk is observed agents update their common prior belief about the state of nature,
pi0, to the posterior belief pi(yk) via Bayes’ rule. Let pr(yk|s) denote the conditional
probability of signal k given state s. The S×K matrix of conditional probabilities:
Y =
(
pr(y1|1) pr(y2|1) pr(y3|1)
pr(y1|2) pr(y2|2) pr(y3|2)
)
,
is called an information structure. Let pr(yk) =
∑
s pr(yk|s)pi0s . Then posteriors are
given by:
pis(yk) =
pr(yk|s)pi0s
pr(yk)
.
If Y is such that pr(yk|1) = pr(yk|2) for all k then the posteriors coincide with the
prior for all signals. We call such an information structure uninformative. We call
the information structure informative otherwise.
2.3 Equilibrium
Both agents take the price vector q as given. Agent c’s budget set, denoted Bc(q, wc),
is the set of consumption plans that can be financed at (q, wc) by a portfolio zc that
satisfies constraints (2.1) - (2.2). That is,
Bc(q, wc) ≡
{
xc ∈ R3+
∣∣∣∣∣ ∃zc ∈ R3 s.t. q0xc0 +∑
s
qsz
c
s = q0w
c
0, x
c
s = w
c
s + z
c
s + z
c
3 ∀s,
zcs ≥ θs ∀s, q3zc3 ≥ q0θ3
}
.
Since agent u neither faces a savings nor short-sale constraints, her budget set,
denoted Bu(q, wu), is simply defined as the set of consumption plans that can be
financed at (q, wu) by a portfolio zu. That is,
Bu(q, wu) ≡
{
xu ∈ R3+
∣∣∣∣∣ ∃zu ∈ R3 s.t. q0xu0 +∑
s
qsz
u
s = q0w
u
0 , x
u
s = w
u
s + z
u
s + z
u
3 ∀s
}
.
A financial market equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1. Given pi, a financial market equilibrium is a collection of prices q ∈
R4++, consumption plans x = (x
u, xc) ∈ R6+ and portfolios z = (zu, zc) ∈ R6, where
8The number of signal realization is set equal to the number of agents plus the number of states
of the world minus one. We need at least three signals to use Carathe´odory’s theorem in the proof
of Corollary 4.
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zh finances the consumption plans xh at (q, wh), such that:
1. xh ∈ argmax {V h(xh, pi) ∣∣xh ∈ Bh(q, wh)} ∀h ∈ {c, u},
2.
∑
h z
h = 0.
Hereafter we refer to any consumption plan satisfying Definition 1 as an equilib-
rium allocation.
To prove the existence of a financial market equilibrium for all posteriors pi ∈
[0, 1], we need the following assumptions on c′s endowment vector:
wc0 ≥ θ3,
wcs ≥ −θs for s = 1, 2.
(A0)
Proposition 1. If (A0) is satisfied, then a financial market equilibrium exist for all
pi ∈ [0, 1].
From here onward we normalize q0 = 1, i.e. the equilibrium price of the con-
sumption good at period 0 is set equal to one. Proposition 1 is proved in several
steps. First we define the concept of a non-arbitrage equilibrium following Magill
and Quinzii (2002). Then we show the equivalence between both types of equilib-
ria in the absence of arbitrage. Working with a non-arbitrage equilibrium is useful
because it allows us to use the standard existence proof in models with contingent
consumption.
Assumption (A0) is needed to ensure that c’s optimization problem has a solution
for every pi ∈ [0, 1]. The savings and short-sale constraints imply that there is a lower
bound on xcs for s = 1, 2 given by:
9
xcs ≥ wcs + θs +
θ3
q1 + q2
for s = 1, 2. (2.3)
The second condition in assumption (A0) implies that the lower bound on xcs is
positive when prices are strictly positive. When both lower bounds are binding, c’s
period 0 consumption is given by: xc0 = w
c
0−θ3−
∑
qsθs. If prices are positive, then
the first condition in (A0) ensures xc0 ≥ 0.
Given a vector of prices q, we say there is no arbitrage if there does not exist
z ∈ R3 such that: [
−q
Φ
]
z > 0.
It is not difficult to show that with our payoff matrix there is no arbitrage if and
only if q1 + q2 = q3.
10 It is direct to see that u’s optimization problem has no
solution if there are arbitrage opportunities. Thus every equilibrium satisfies absence
9To see this just replace the lower bounds on zcl for all l in the expressions for x
c
s for s = 1, 2.
10If q1 + q2 > q3 use the vector z = (−1,−1, 1). If q1 + q2 < q3 use the vector z = (1, 1,−1).
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of arbitrage. Since the gross interest rate is given by R = (q1 + q2)
−1, then in
equilibrium R = q−13 .
Before discussing the effect of changes in information on welfare, we show that,
given a posterior, if the Planner is constrained to satisfy c’s mandatory savings
and short-sale constrains he cannot obtain a Pareto improvement. We follow the
literature on constrained Pareto optimality and assume that the Planner can freely
allocate period 0 consumption, but period 1 consumption can only be allocate using
the existing assets. The allocation assigned by the Planner to agent c is required to
satisfy the short-sale constraints and the savings constraint, that is q3z
c
3 ≥ θ3 where
q3 is the period zero equilibrium price of the bond before the Planner redistribute
assets and period 0 consumption.
Definition 2. The consumption allocation x ∈ R6+ is constrained feasible if there
exists an asset allocation z ∈ R6 such that:
1. xhs = w
h
s + z
h
s + z
h
3 , for s = 1, 2. ∀h,
2.
∑
h z
h = 0,
3. zcs ≥ θs, for s = 1, 2,
4. zc3 ≥ θ3R.
Proposition 2. There is no constrained feasible allocation that Pareto dominates
the financial market equilibrium allocation.
To prove Proposition 2 we follow the standard proof of constrained Pareto op-
timality in economies with two period and a single consumption good, with the
difference that we request allocations to be constrained feasible.
We define the constrained feasible set under posterior pi, CFS(R), as the set of
all constrained feasible allocations. Formally:
Definition 3. The constrained feasible set, CFS(R), is the set of all constrained
feasible allocations:
CFS(R) =
{
x ∈ R6+
∣∣ ∃z ∈ R6 s.t. xhs = whs + zhs + zh3 ∀(h, s),
zcs ≥ θs ∀s, zc3 ≥ θ3R and
∑
h
zh = 0
}
.
It is straightforward to redefine the constrained feasible set independently of the
portfolio of agent c by replacing the lower bounds on the components of this vector
straight into the expressions for xcs:
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Definition 4. Given a posterior pi, the constrained feasible set, CFS′(R), is the set
of all constrained feasible allocations:
CFS′(R) =
{
x ∈ R2×3+ | xcs ≥ wcs + θs + θ3R ∀s, and xu = w − xc
}
.
It is trivial to show that CFS(R) ⊂ CFS′(R). It is also true that CFS′(R) ⊂
CFS(R).11 Notice that if we were to write Definition 2 in terms of contingent
consumption instead, we would have to rewrite the conditions for feasibility, and
replace conditions 3. and 4. by equation (2.3).
2.4 Changes in information and welfare
Proposition 2 tells us that changing the posterior, and hence the information struc-
ture, is a necessary condition for obtaining Pareto improvements if the Planner is
force to satisfy c’s constraints at equilibrium prices.
The mandatory savings constraint for agent c implies the Planner has to satisfy
a constraint that depends on equilibrium prices and, therefore, on the agent’s poste-
riors. By changing the information structure, the Planner can change the posterior
of the agents and, as R is a function of pi, shift the mandatory savings constraints
to reach allocations that were not feasible under the original information structure.
Thus it may be the case that changing the information structure allows the Planner
to reach allocations that are Pareto superior with respect to the starting information
structure, but that weren’t feasible before the change in information. For example if
R is increasing in pi, by inducing a posterior below the prior the Planner can enlarge
the constrained feasible set. For this reason from now on we make explicit the de-
pendence of the constrained feasible set on the posterior, i.e. we wright CFS(R(pi)).
We wish to study the welfare consequences of changes in information. Our
reference point will always be what we call the uninformative equilibrium. Under
an uninformative information structure, by definition pi(yk) = pi
0 for k = 1, 2, 3. We
define an uninformative equilibrium, as an equilibrium of the economy where agents
make decisions on the basis of the prior pi0.
By Proposition 1 there exist at least one vector of prices that clears the market. If
the equilibrium is unique, it is clear that this unique equilibrium is the uninformative
equilibrium. If there are multiple equilibria, we pick one of them, and set the
uninformative equilibrium equal to it for every signal realisation. Therefore, by
definition, the uninformative equilibrium is signal invariant.
Definition 5. Consider an information structure Y . Let x(yk) be an (equilibrium)
allocation when signal yk is observed in the economy with information structure Y .
11To prove that CFS′(R) ⊂ CFS(R), fix zc3 = θ3R and notice that with the existing asset
structure, and ignoring c’s constraints, the agents can generate any period 1 consumption in R2+.
Hence there exist a zcs such that w
c
s + z
c
s + z
c
3 = x
c
s ≥ wcs + θs + θ3R for s = 1, 2. Our choice of zc3
implies: zcs ≥ θs for s = 1, 2. Finally xu = w − xc implies
∑
h z
h = 0.
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Then, x(Y ) = (x(y1), x(y2), x(y3)) is an (equilibrium) allocation under information
structure Y . If Y is the uninformative information structure, then we define an
uninformative equilibrium allocation as the equilibrium allocation under information
structure Y , say x(Y ), that satisfies x(y1) = x(y2) = x(y3).
Starting from the uninformative equilibrium, we will look for an informative
information structures that allows the Planner to obtain welfare improvements in a
sense that will be made precise below. We consider two welfare notions depending
on whether one evaluate allocations ex-ante or ex-post, i.e. before or after observing
the signal. Formally:
Definition 6. Let Y and Ŷ be an uninformative and an informative information
structure respectively. Let pi(yk) and pr(yk) for k = 1, 2, 3, be the posteriors and
the probabilities of the posteriors under Ŷ , respectively. We say x(Y ) is ex-ante
constrained Pareto efficient under Ŷ if there is no allocation under information
structure Ŷ , call it x(Ŷ ) = (x̂(y1), x̂(y2), x̂(y3)), such that x̂(yk) ∈ CFS(R(pi(yk)))
for all k and: ∑
k
pr(yk)V (x̂
h(yk), pi(yk)) ≥
∑
k
pr(yk)V (x
h(yk), pi(yk)),
for all h ∈ H and with strict inequality for some h.
Definition 7. Let Y and Ŷ be an uninformative and an informative information
structure respectively. Let pi(yk) and pr(yk) for k = 1, 2, 3, be the posteriors and
the probabilities of the posteriors under Ŷ , respectively. We say x(Y ) is ex-post
constrained Pareto efficient under information structure Ŷ if there is no allocation
under information structure Ŷ , call it x(Ŷ ) = (x̂(y1), x̂(y2), x̂(y3)), such that x̂(yk) ∈
CFS(R(pi(yk))) for all k and:
V (x̂h(yk), pi(yk)) ≥ V (xh(yk), pi(yk)),
for all h ∈ H and with strict inequality for some h, for all k.
From Definition 6 we see that the concept of an ex-ante constrained Pareto im-
provement is related to an (constrained) improvement in expected value. Definition
7 provides a stronger concept of improvement: a (constrained) Pareto improvement
for every signal at the new posteriors. Clearly an ex-post improvement is a sufficient
condition for an ex-ante improvement.
Consider the right diagram in Figure 2.1. There we show, for a two dimensional
information structure, the uninformative equilibrium under each signal, denoted by
x∗. Remember that this equilibrium is constant across signals by definition. In the
left diagram we show some constrained feasible allocation under every signal of an
informative information structure. Notice that x(y1) and x(y2) may differ. When
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looking for ex-ante improvements, we take each utility level under the informative
information structure, and compute the expected value for every agent using the
probability of the signals as weights. Then we compare this expected value with
the utility that the agents obtain in the uninformative equilibrium. We look if they
are better off before receiving information. When looking for ex-post improvements,
we compare the x(y1) allocation with x
∗, and x(y2) with x∗ separately. If there is a
constrained Pareto improvement for both cases, then we have an ex-post constrained
Pareto improvement. We look if they are better off after receiving each signal.
Figure 2.1: Ex-ante and Ex-post constrained Pareto improvements.
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To prove the existence of ex-ante improvements one could work with the ex-
ante utility function used in Definition 6. Noticing that the existence of ex-ante
improvement is closely related to the shape of the boundary of the utility possibility
set, the Pareto frontier, helps us to simplify the problem. Formally, we define the
Pareto frontier as a function F : [0, 1]× R 7→ R given by:
F (pi, V ) = {Max
xc
v(xc0) +
∑
pisv(x
c
s)
s. t. xcs ≥ wcs + θs + θ3R(pi) for s = 1, 2,
v(w − xc0) +
∑
pisv(w − xcs) ≥ V } .
(2.4)
Since we assume v is strictly increasing, the last constraint in (2.4) will always
bind at a solution. Furthermore, Bayes’ rule implies that posteriors have to sat-
isfy:
∑
k pr(yk)pi(yk) = pi
0 for any information structure. This condition is what
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) call Bayes-plausibility of posteriors. Since by def-
inition V (xc, pi) = v(xc0) +
∑
pisv(x
c
s), we can relate the existence of an ex-ante
constrained Pareto improvement to the properties of function F .
Proposition 3. Let pi0 and V h0 be the common prior and the equilibrium utility
level of agent h in the uninformative equilibrium , respectively. The uninformative
equilibrium allocation is not ex-ante constrained Pareto efficient if and only if there
exist vectors (τ1, τ2, τ3) ∈ ∆2, (pi1, pi2, pi3) ∈ [0, 1]3 and (V1, V2, V3) ∈ R3 such that:
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1.
∑
k τkpik = pi
0,
2.
∑
k τkVk = V
u
0 ,
3.
∑
k τkF (pik, Vk) > F (pi
0, V u0 ).
The proof of Proposition 3 is direct from the definitions of an ex-ante improve-
ment and the Pareto frontier, using constrained Pareto optimality of the uninforma-
tive equilibrium, and the fact that the uninformative equilibrium is signal invariant.
Proposition 3 shows that we can work with the Pareto frontier to study the existence
of an ex-ante improvement. In Corollary 4 we relate this to the concavification of
F .
Definition 8. Let g : X 7→ R. The concavification of g is given by: cav g(x) ≡
sup {y|(x, y) ∈ co(g)}, where co(g) denotes the convex hull of the graph of g.
From Definition 8 it is direct to notice that cav g is concave, and everywhere
weakly greater than g. While there are alternative definitions for the concavification
of a function, the one we use is useful when applying Carathe´odory’s theorem when
proving the “if” part in Corollary 4.
Corollary 4. There exist an ex-ante constrained Pareto improvement over the un-
informative equilibrium if and only if the concavification of F at (pi0, V u0 ) is greater
than F (pi0, V u0 ). There cannot be an ex-ante constrained Pareto improvement if F
is concave.
In Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) the authors study a symmetric information
model where a sender can choose a signal she reveals to a receiver, who takes a
(contractable) action that affects the payoff of both agents. They ask whether there
exist a signal that leads the receiver to take an action that benefits the sender,
relative to the equilibrium where actions are taken based on the prior beliefs. They
show that there exist such a signal if and only if the concavification of the expected
utility of the Sender evaluated at the action based on the prior beliefs lies above the
expected utility of the Sender evaluated at the same point.
Similar to their analysis we can relate the existence of an information structure
that makes the Planner better off with the concavification of the Pareto frontier. We
can think of the Planner as the sender, who can choose the information structure.
Agents c and u play the role of the receiver. They observe the signal and their
actions (excess demands) determine the equilibrium interest rate, which affect the
Planner’s payoff through the constrained feasible set.
A difference between our model and those considered in Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011), is that in their paper Bayes plausibility is the only constraint that the
sender has to satisfy. Our sender also has to make sure that the levels of utility he
assigns to agent u in every signal are such that she is indifferent with respect to the
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uninformative equilibrium in expected value. In a sense this makes the problem of
the sender more flexible as his expected payoff function can fail to be concave in
beliefs, utility levels, or both. However is makes the analysis more complicated.
The concavification of a function has also been used to analyze the value of
knowledge in a game theoretical context. Aumann and Maschler (1995) use it to
analyze whether a player benefits from using his knowledge of chance’s choice in a
infinite 2-person game. To our knowledge there are no papers taking this approach
when studying the value of public information in a market economy. The “usual”
approach is to work with information structure defined as we did in section 2 (or
by joint probability distributions as in Gottardi and Rahi (2014)). From now on we
think of information structures as a vector of posteriors and a vector of probabilities
of signals such that Bayes-plausibility is satisfied.
2.5 Ex-post improvements
In a similar model, but without c’s savings and short-sale constraints, Hakansson,
Kunkel, and Ohlson (1982) showed that if prior beliefs and information structures are
homogeneous, utility functions are time-additive, and the uninformative equilibrium
is fully Pareto efficient, then there cannot be an ex-ante improvement over the
uninformative equilibrium. Thus no ex-post improvements exist either.
Consider an uninformative equilibrium where c’s savings constraint is not bind-
ing. Since with the existent assets agent h can generate any consumption vector
in R3+, this implies that such an equilibrium belongs to the Pareto set and hence is
fully Pareto efficient. Therefore a necessary condition for the existence of an ex-post
improvement is for c’s savings constraint to be binding in the uninformative equi-
librium. To ensure this is the case, we need to introduce some assumptions in the
parameters of the model.
First, endowments in state one and state two have to differ, otherwise there is
no uncertainty. We assume that c is relatively rich in state one:
wc1 > w
c
2. (A1)
Second, a priori we do not know which of the two lower bounds on c’s consumption
in period one is higher. However it simplifies the analysis if knew their relative size.
We assume that the lower bound on xc1 is the biggest of the two:
wc1 + θ1 ≥ wc2 + θ2. (A2)
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Define the priors pi1, pi2 and pi as:
pi1 ≡
2θ3 + 2(θ1 + w
c
1)− wc0 − wc2
wc1 − wc2
,
pi2 ≡
2θ3 + 2(θ2 + w
c
2)− wc0 − wc2
wc1 − wc2
,
pi ≡ max{pi1, pi2} = pi1.
Proposition 5 show that pi is a threshold such that if the prior is below pi, then the
uninformative equilibrium is not fully Pareto efficient. For pi to be in the interval
(0, 1) we have to assume:
0.5(wc0 + w
c
1) > θ1 + θ3 + w
c
1 > 0.5(w
c
0 + w
c
2). (A3)
Proposition 5. Assume (A1) and (A2) hold. Equilibria are full Pareto efficient
if and only if pi ≥ pi. If an equilibrium is not fully Pareto efficient, then the lower
bound on xc1 is binding at that equilibrium, i.e. x
c
1 = w
c
1 + θ1 + θ3R(pi).
Assumptions (A1) and (A2) are without loss of generality, we just specify the
relative magnitudes to simplify our analysis. If we write (A1) with the reverse
inequality, then the condition in Proposition 5 would also hold with the reverse
inequality. If (A2) were to hold with the reverse inequality then pi = pi2, but we
would have to adjust assumption (A3) to make sure that pi2 ∈ (0, 1). Finally,
assumption (A3) is important. This condition ensures that we can partition [0, 1] in
two non-empty sets such that equilibria are first best if and only if the posterior is
in one of the partitions, or equilibria are not first best and at least one of the lower
bounds on c’s period one consumption is binding if the posterior is in the other
partition. We exploit this difference in the section on ex-ante improvements.
From now on assume pi0 ≤ pi. We showed at the end of section 3 that equilibria
are constrained Pareto efficient. The following proposition shows that if the con-
strained feasible set does not change with changes in the information structure, the
Planner cannot obtain an ex-post constrained Pareto improvement.
Proposition 6. Let x be the equilibrium allocation under pi0. There is no x̂ ∈
CFS(R(pi0)) and pi1 ∈ [0, 1] such that V (x̂h, pi1) ≥ V (xh, pi1) for all h and with
strict inequality for some h.
By constrained Pareto optimality, it follows that the allocations that make both
agents better off at the prior are not constrained feasible. Proposition 6 shows that
this remains true even if we use a different posterior to compute the utility that
both agents get from consumption.
To understand the idea behind Proposition 6 see Figure 2.2. For simplicity.
assume there is no consumption in period 0, and that c faces some lower bound
on period 1 consumption, depicted by the dashed straight lines in the figure. The
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shaded area represents the constrained feasible set. Assume both constraints are
binding at equilibrium and that this equilibrium is not in the Pareto set, which is
depicted by the diagonal of the box. The solid indifference curves represent this
equilibrium. We need to understand how the indifference curves that pass trough
the initial equilibrium allocation change when we increase the posterior of state one.
By definition the new indifference curves, depicted by the dashed lines, pass through
the initial equilibrium. To keep u indifferent we need to increase consumption in
one state and reduce consumption in the other state, but this implies reducing one
of c’s consumptions. By doing that we are choosing an allocation outside of the
constrained feasible set.
If only one constraint is binding at equilibrium,12 then the argument we just gave
is not enough. If only the constraint on xc1 is binding, then x
c
1 > x
c
2 and x
u
2 > x
u
1 .
13
Thus we could reduce xu1 and increase x
u
2 to make u indifferent without leaving the
constrained feasible set. But as MRSc1,2 < MRS
u
1,2 this change cannot make c better
off, where MRShs,s′ =
∂v(xh1 )
∂xh1
/
∂v(xh2 )
xh2
.
Figure 2.2: Indifference curves rotate at the equilibrium allocation when the poste-
rior of state one is increased.
u
c
x2
x1
Thus the only way in which we can obtain ex-post improvements is if we can find
a vector of posteriors such that the equilibrium interest rate under each signal is
12 By Proposition 5 there are no equilibria that are not fully Pareto efficient and the lower bound
on xc1 is not binding.
13In this case the lower bound on xc2 is somewhere to the right of the vertical dashed line depicted
in the figure.
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below the interest rate of the uninformative equilibrium. In that case the constrained
feasible set in the uninformative equilibrium is contained in the constrained feasible
set of each signal of the informative information structure. The next Theorem is a
direct consequence of Proposition 6.
Theorem 7. Let pik for k = 1, 2, 3 be the posteriors under some informative in-
formation structure. The uninformative equilibrium is ex-post constrained Pareto
efficient if and only if R(pik) ≥ R(pi0) for some k.
The analysis above shows that ex-post improvements are possible if and only if
the constrained feasible set under pi0 is contained in the constrained feasible set of
the posteriors under all signals of the informative information structure. This is
the case when R(pi0) > R(pi(yk)) for all k. When considering marginal changes in
the posterior, then an ex-post improvement exists if and only if R attains a strict
local maximum at pi0. This differs with Gottardi and Rahi (2014) who show that
when markets are incomplete ex-post improvements are always feasible, and in no
way this depends on how prices react to the new information.
The next corollary is implied directly by Theorem 7:
Corollary 8. If R is monotonic, then the uninformative equilibrium is ex-post con-
strained Pareto efficient for every informative information structure.
The shape of the equilibrium interest rate as a function of the posterior is key
for the existence of ex-post improvements. In appendix 2.H we show that Corollary
8 is not an empty statement. In Lemma 3 we use the implicit function theorem
to prove that when (A2) holds with equality R is a monotone increasing function
below pi for any v strictly increasing and strictly concave.
2.6 Ex-ante improvements
In this section we study the existence of ex-ante constrained Pareto improvements.
In the first subsection we study the shape of the function F , and in particular we
investigate if it is concave. In the second subsection we look for sufficient conditions
for ex-ante improvements to exist.
For the discussion in the main text we assume that assumption (A2) is satisfied
with equality, i.e wc1 + θ1 = w
c
2 + θ2. The proofs in the general case are relegated to
the appendix.
2.6.1 Non-concavity of the Pareto frontier
In Corollary 4 we have shown that a necessary condition for the existence of ex-ante
improvements is for F to be non-concave. To prove the non-concavity of F (pi, V ), we
show it is not concave in pi when V is given by u’s utility level at the uninformative
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equilibrium, V u(pi0). We define a new function f(pi, pi0) ≡ F (pi, V u(pi0)) and show
that f(pi, pi0) is not concave in pi. Formally,
f(pi, pi0) = F (pi, V u(pi0)) = {Max
xc
v(xc0) +
∑
pisv(x
c
s)
s. t. xcs ≥ wcs + θs + θ3R(pi) for s = 1, 2,
v(w − xc0) +
∑
pisv(w − xcs) ≥ V u(pi0) } .
(2.5)
When wc1 + θ1 = w
c
2 + θ2, there is always full smoothing in period 1 consumption in
equilibrium, as both lower bounds on period 1 consumption coincide. The solution to
the maximization problem in (2.5) is characterized by xc1 = x
c
2 for all pi.
14 Therefore
the function f coincides with the function f̂ defined below:
f̂(pi, pi0) = { Max
{xc0,xc1}
v(xc0) + v(x
c
1)
s. t. xc1 ≥ wc1 + θ1 + θ3R(pi) ,
v(w − xc0) + v(w − xc1) ≥ V u(pi0) } .
Notice that the function f̂ depends on pi only through R(·) as the objective
function is independent of the posterior. If f̂ is defined at pi, then f̂(pi, pi0) is equal
to some constant f(pi0) for all pi ≥ pi, as R(pi) = 1 for all pi ≥ pi, i.e. the constrained
feasible set is constant to the right of pi.15 Also notice that f̂(pi0, pi0) ≥ f̂(pi, pi0) for
all pi ≥ pi, this follows from the fact that the constrained feasible set under pi ≥ pi
is a proper subset of the constrained feasible set under pi0, as R(pi0) < 1 = R(pi).16
Therefore f̂(pi0, pi0) cannot be lower than f̂(pi, pi0). In fact, as the constrained feasible
set under every posterior, and in particular pi0, is a convex set and the maximiser of
the problem defining f̂(pi, pi0) belongs to CFS(R(pi0)) for all pi ≥ pi, strict concavity
of v implies that f̂(pi0, pi0) > f̂(pi, pi0) for all pi ≥ pi.
Consider the posteriors pi1 = pi0 and pi2 = 1. There exist a τ ∈ (0, 1) such that
τpi1+(1−τ)pi2 = pi. But τ f̂(pi1, pi0)+(1−τ)f̂(pi2, pi0) > f̂(pi, pi0). Hence the function
f̂ , and therefore f , is not concave in pi.
Proposition 9. Assume f is defined at (pi, pi0). If (A2) is satisfied with equality,
or if (A2) is satisfied with strict inequality and f is not differentiable at pi, then f
is not concave.
In the general case, when (A2) is satisfied with strict inequality, it is not longer
true that the objective function in the problem defining f is independent of the
14 If the constraints on xc1 and x
c
2 are both binding at the solution, then x
c
1 = x
c
2 at the solution.
If both constraints are not binding, then xc0 = x
c
1 = x
c
2 at the solution. If only the constraint
on xc1 is binding, then at the solution x
c
0 = x
c
2 > x
c
1, but then if we assign to c the constrained
feasible allocation (xc0, x˜
c, x˜c), where x˜c = pixc1 + (1− pi)xc2, we make both agents better off as v is
strictly concave. Therefore we cannot have xc0 = x
c
2 > x
c
1 at a solution. To discard the case when
xc0 = x
c
1 > x
c
2 at equilibrium, we use the same logic.
15 The same argument implies that if f̂ is defined at pi for a given pi0, then it is defined for all
pi ∈ [pi, 1].
16See appendix 2.H.
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posterior, as the solution may not display full smoothing in period 1. This implies
that we cannot use the approach explained above to prove non-concavity. Lemma
4 in appendix 2.H shows that R(pi) < 1 for all pi < pi, so while it is still true
that CFS(R(pi))⊂CFS(R(pi0)) for all pi ≥ pi, now the objective function is (weakly)
increasing in pi, as it is always true that xc1 ≥ xc2. Therefore when comparing pi0
with a posterior to the right of pi we have two forces going in opposite directions.
To prove non-concavity in the general case we do an analysis around pi. We show
that when f is non-differentiable at pi its slope marginally to the right of pi is bigger
than its slope marginally to the left of pi. This condition allows us to prove non-
concavity independently of the actual sign of these slopes. A sufficient condition for
non-differentiability of f is:
wu0 − wu2 6= −2(θ1 + θ3). (A4)
Numerical results confirm that the intersection between the subset of parameter
values that satisfy assumptions (A0)-(A3) and (A2) with strict inequalities, and the
subset of parameter values that satisfy (A4) is not empty.
So far we have assumed that f is defined at (pi, pi0). In appendix 2.I, Lemma
8 provides a sufficient condition for f to be defined at (pi, pi0). Using the implicit
function theorem we show that if pi0 is sufficiently close to pi, then f is indeed defined
at (pi0, pi). When (A2) holds with equality, looking at Figure 2.3 it is not difficult
to imagine why this is the case. If pi0 is arbitrarily close to pi, then points A and C
are arbitrarily close, as the allocation in A is always in the interior of the box, we
obtain feasibility of point C.
Notice that the analysis above helps us explain why there cannot be an im-
provement if R is independent of pi, or in the standard pure exchange economy with
complete markets and no aggregate uncertainty. In both cases the objective function
and the constraints are independent of pi. Strict concavity of the objective function
and convexity of the constrained set imply concavity of F .
2.6.2 Sufficient conditions for an ex-ante improvement
In the previous subsection we argued that f is not concave. In this subsection we
first determine the actual shape of f and that of its concavification. We complete the
analysis with a sufficient condition for the existence of ex-ante constrained Pareto
improvements. In what follows we assume pi0 < pi to ensure the uninformative
equilibrium is not fully Pareto efficient.
By Corollary 4 and the definition of f , to see if ex-ante improvements are possible
we need to compare cav f and f at the point (pi0, pi0). For simplicity, in the main
text we assume that f(pi, pi0) is defined for all pi ∈ [0, 1] and that (A2) holds with
equality. In the appendix we provide general proofs when (A2) holds with weak
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inequality.
Remember that when (A2) is satisfied with equality we always have xc1 = x
c
2 in
equilibrium. Therefore we can depict the equilibrium in an Edgeworth box with
period 0 and period 1 consumption in the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively.
In Figure 2.3, the dashed horizontal line represents the lower bound on period one
consumption and the uninformative equilibrium is given by a point like A for any
pi0 < pi. The Pareto set, characterized by full consumption smoothing across periods
(and states), is depicted by the diagonal line connecting the bottom left and upper
right corners of the box.
Figure 2.3: Uninformative equilibrium and allocations xh(pi0) and xh(pi0).
wc1 + θ1 + θ3
wc1 + θ1 + θ3R(pi0)
wc1 + θ1 + θ3R(pi)
c
u
x1 = x2
x0
A
C
B
A’
C’
B’
Let 1 ∈ R3 be the vector of ones. Consider the allocation
xc(pi0) = 1x(pi0) and xu(pi0) = 1w − xc(pi0),
where xc(pi0) is a constant consumption plan for c that gives u her uninformative
equilibrium utility, V u(pi0). That is, x(pi0) is the solution to
2v(w − x) = V u(pi0).
Allocation (xc(pi0), xu(pi0)) is depicted as point B in Figure 2.3, the point where
u’s indifference curve that passes through the uninformative equilibrium alloca-
tion (point A) intersects the Pareto set. Notice that this allocation gives c the
highest possible utility conditional on u being indifferent with respect to the un-
informative equilibrium. Thus, if (xc(pi0), xu(pi0)) is constrained feasible for pi,
f(pi, pi0) = V (xc(pi0), pi).
Consider also the allocation
xc(pi0) =
(
x(pi0), wc1 + θ1 + θ3, w
c
1 + θ1 + θ3
)
and xu(pi0) = 1w − xc(pi0),
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where x(pi0) is the period 0 consumption level for c such that if she consumes wc1+θ1+
θ3 in both states in period 1, then u is indifferent with respect to the uninformative
equilibrium. That is, x(pi0) is the solution to:
v(w − x) + v(wu1 − θ1 − θ3) = V u(pi0).
Allocation (xc(pi0), xu(pi0)) is depicted as point C in Figure 2.3. Notice that xc(pi0)
is constrained feasible for every posterior as R(pi) ≤ 1 for every pi ∈ [0, 1].
By construction u is indifferent between the uninformative equilibrium and al-
locations xu(pi0) and xu(pi0). We have drawn Figure 2.3 in such a way that these
allocations are well defined, however it may be the case that one or both of them
are not feasible. Lemma 9 in appendix 2.J gives us a sufficient condition for both
allocations to be feasible. Assume for now that both x(pi0) and x(pi0) are in [0, w].
Define pi(pi0) as a belief such that x(pi0) is c’s equilibrium consumption in state
one. That is, pi(pi0) is the value of pi that solves:
x(pi0) = wc1 + θ1 + θ3R(pi).
Graphically, pi(pi0) is the belief that makes the lower bound on state one consumption
to pass through point B in Figure 2.3. Assume for now that pi(pi0) ∈ [0, 1]. Note
that pi(pi0) < pi0 as R is monotone increasing below pi whenever (A2) holds with
equality.
As R(pi) is increasing in pi for all pi < pi, then xc(pi0) is constrained feasible for
all pi ≤ pi(pi0). Consequently, f is constant, say equal to f(pi0), to the left of pi(pi0).
Note that f(pi0, pi0) is c’s utility associated with the indifference curve through point
A, f(pi(pi0), pi0) is c’s utility associated with the indifference curve through point B.
Since point A is not in the Pareto set by Proposition 5, then f(pi, pi0) > f(pi0, pi0)
for all pi ≤ pi(pi0).
The function f is constant to the left of pi(pi0) and in the previous subsection we
argue it is also constant to the right of pi, i.e. f(pi, pi0) = f(pi0) for all pi ≥ pi. A
priori we do not know the shape that f takes for pi ∈ [pi(pi0), pi]. If f is convex in
this interval, then we have ex-ante improvements, as the concavification of f in this
case is equal to f to the left of pi(pi0) and to the right of pi, and the straight line
joining f(pi, pi0) and f(pi(pi0), pi0) elsewhere.
In Figure 2.4a we have drawn f assuming it is strictly concave for pi ∈ [pi, pi]. In
this case the concavification of f is given by the straight line starting from f(1, pi0)
that is tangent to f , and cav f coincides with f for posteriors below the tangency
point. Denote the tangency point by pit. Therefore, we have ex-ante improvements
if and only if pi0 > pit.
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Figure 2.4: f and its concavification when (A2) holds with equality.
pi
f(pi, pi0)
pipi pit
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Af(pi0)
f(pi0)
(a) pi0 6= pi
pi
f(pi, pi0)
pipi0 pi0
f(·, pi0)
f(·, pi)
f(·, pi0)
(b) pi0 → pi
Suppose we have a common prior pi0 below pit so that cav f(pi0, pi0) coincides
with f(pi0, pi0) as in point A in Figure 2.4a. A hasty conjecture would be that for a
common prior pi0 to the right of pit, cav f(pi0, pi0) would lie strictly above f(pi0, pi0),
like in point B in the figure. However, notice that pi, pit, f and f are all functions
of pi0. So by increasing pi0 we change pi and pit and also the value that f attains at
those points and at the point pi, as by changing the common prior we are changing
the expected wealth of the agents in the uninformative equilibrium and the position
of u’s indifference curve at this equilibrium.
To understand how f changes as we increase the prior it is useful to go back to
Figure 2.3. In Figure 2.3 we show the effect of an increase in the prior on allocations
xh and xh. If we change pi0 to pi0 > pi0, as u is relatively poor in period 1 (assumption
(A1)), and as utilities are independent of the probability of state one (since (A2)
holds with equality), u’s indifference curve at the uninformative equilibrium is shifted
down. The same argument gives us that c’s indifference curve is shifted upwards and
the uninformative equilibrium moves from point A to point A’, i.e. c attains a higher
utility at the uninformative equilibrium. Thus f(pi0, pi0) > f(pi0, pi0). By definition,
f(pi0) is the utility of agent c at the point where u’s uninformative equilibrium
cuts the Pareto set. As u’s indifference is shifted down it cuts the Pareto set in
a point that gives c more consumption in every period, thus f(pi0) > f(pi0) (see
points B’ and B). As R is monotone increasing below pi and wc1 + θ1 + R(pi(pi
0)) >
wc1 + θ1 +R(pi(pi
0)), then pi(pi0) > pi(pi0). Finally, as u’s indifference curve is shifted
down and xc1 = w1 + θ1 + θ3 is unchanged the point where it cuts the horizontal line
at xc1 = w1 + θ1 + θ3 gives more period zero consumption to c, i.e. x
c
0 is increased.
Thus f(pi0) > f(pi0) (see point C’ and C).
The analysis above explains why f is shifted upwards when we increase agents’
prior, as shown in Figure 2.4b. The extreme case when pi0 = pi is also shown in
Figure 2.4b. In that case the uninformative equilibrium is in the Pareto set, and it
is constrained feasible for every posterior, hence f is flat, and it lies above f(pi, pi0)
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for all pi ∈ [0, 1] and all pi0 < pi. See point A in Figure 2.5.
Thus we see that even though f fails to be concave, it is not direct to see if cav
f is above f at the point (pi0, pi0). If for a given prior we have pi0 < pit(pi0), it is also
not clear if by changing the prior we can move the economy to an uninformative
equilibrium that is not ex-ante constrained Pareto efficient.
We will show that ex-ante improvements exist if pi0 is close to pi. Let’s redefine
the prior on state one as pi0() ≡ pi − , with  ∈ [0, pi]. Therefore now all x, x and
pi are functions of .
The uninformative equilibrium displays full smoothing if and only if pi0 ≥ pi ,
hence pi() = pi0() if and only if  = 0. Above we argue that pi() < pi0() for all
 > 0.17 Consider the posteriors pi1 = pi(), pi2 = 1 and pi3 = pi0().
Notice that xc() is constrained feasible under pi1, and xc() is constrained feasible
under pi2. For an ex-ante improvement to exist, it is sufficient to find τ 1 ∈ (0, 1)
and τ 3 ∈ [0, 1) such that τ 1 + τ 3 < 1 and:
pi0() = τ 1pi1 + (1− τ 1 − τ 3)pi2 + τ 3pi3,
V c0 < τ
1V (xc(pi0), pi1) + (1− τ 1 − τ 3)V (xc(pi0), pi2) + τ 3V c0 ,
since u is indifferent with respect to the uninformative equilibrium by construction.
Bayes plausibility implies that τ 1 has to satisfy:
τ 1 = (1− τ 3)pi
0()− pi2
pi1 − pi2 = (1− τ
3)
pi0()− 1
pi()− 1 ≡ τ˜().
Let
V () ≡ V (xc(pi0), pi()),
V () ≡ V (xc(pi0), 1),
V0() ≡ V c0 .
Agent c is ex-ante indifferent between mixing V (), V () and V0(), and the unin-
formative equilibrium if she gets V () with probability:
τ 1 = (1− τ 3)V0()− V ()
V ()− V () ≡ τ̂().
If τ̂() ≤ τ˜(), then there exist an ex-ante constrained Pareto improvement as V () >
V0() > V (). Equality between τ̂ and τ˜ is sufficient as the Planner could still smooth
period 0 consumption between signals.
The limit as  goes to 0 of τ˜() is equal to 1 − τ3, as pi() converges to pi0() as
17At a first glance there is no reason to think that pi() ∈ [0, 1]. For example if x(pi0) <
min {wc1 + θ1 + θ3R(pi)} then x(pi0) is never constrained feasible, or if R is strictly increasing below
pi, we may have x(pi0) < wc1 + θ1 + θ3R(0) in which case the same conclusion applies. In appendix
2.J we formally show that pi is well defined in an interval around  = 0.
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 tends to zero. If we can show that the limit as  tends to 0 of τ̂() is equal to
a(1 − τ3) for some constant a < 1, then we would have proved the existence of an
ex-ante improvement.
Figure 2.5: Indifference curves at  = 0.
wc1 + θ1 + θ3R(pi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
wc1+θ1+θ3
wc1 + θ1 + θ3R(pi0)
wc1 + θ1 + θ3R(pi)
c
u
x1 = x2
x0
A
B
C
D
V
′
V ′0
In Figure 2.5 we show the picture that led us to think that the limit of τ̂ is
strictly lower than 1−τ3. For this, we need the limit of V0()−V ()V ()−V () to be strictly lower
than one. From the figure we see that the ratio is strictly lower than one for every
 > 0. Agent c’s indifference curve at point C represents V0(), her indifference curve
at point B represents V (), and her indifference curve at point D represents V ().
Thus it is direct to see that V0()−V ()
V ()−V () < 1 for all  > 0. However this is not sufficient
to prove that the limit of the ratio is strictly below one, as the ratio is not defined
at  = 0. Point A depicts the equilibrium when  = 0. In that point V , V and V0
take the same value.
If we increase  marginally starting from  = 0, the indifference curves of the
agents are shifted from point A to those in the right of the figure. From c’s perspec-
tive, point B is associated with higher utility relative to point C, i.e. V () > V0().
As we can think of the (right) derivatives of V and V0 at  = 0 as the distance be-
tween c’s indifference curves at points A and and B, or points A and C respectively,
this suggest that if we apply L’Hoˆpital’s rule to compute the limit of V0()−V ()
V ()−V () , we
obtain a limit strictly lower than one.
Theorem 10. Suppose either (A2) is satisfied with equality or (A4) holds. Then
there exist a δ > 0 such that if  ∈ (0, δ) then the uninformative equilibrium is not
ex-ante constrained Pareto efficient.
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However when using L’Hoˆpital’s rule to compute the limit of τ̂(), we need to
apply it twice as in the limit when the increment of  goes to zero, V ′0 , V
′
, and V ′
coincide. Therefore we use an alternative approach to compute the limit of τ̂().
First we define the function g(a, ) = aV ()+(1−a)V ()−V0(), mapping R× [0, pi]
into R. Then we show that there exist a < 1 such that g(a, ), as a function of ,
attains a strict local minimum at (a, 0), and that g(a, 0) = 0. Thus g(a, ) > 0 for
all  in a neighborhood of zero. Using the definition of g, g(a, ) > 0 is equivalent to
aV () + (1− a)V ()− V0() > 0, or V0()−V ()V ()−V () < a < 1 for all  in the neighborhood.
This last expression tells us that the limit of τ̂ is strictly below 1− τ3.
When assumption (A2) holds with strict inequality, the difference is that we do
not know a priori if pi() is above or below pi0(). In appendix 2.J we show that
pi is a continuous function in an interval around  = 0. As pi = pi0 if and only if
 = 0, continuity implies that pi() is always above or below pi0(). If pi() < pi0(),
then the analysis explained above is still valid. If pi() > pi0(), then we need to set
pi2 = pi0()− γ for some fixed and small γ > 0.
2.7 Conclusion
We have shown that in economies where savings and short-sale constraints may
prevent equilibrium from being fully Pareto efficient, public information may have
positive social value. Information-driven price changes may allow a benevolent social
planner facing the same information and asset constraints, to obtain ex-ante con-
strained Pareto improvements under quite general conditions. Unlike Gottardi and
Rahi (2014), ex-post improvements are attainable only under special conditions for
the equilibrium interest rate. The reaction of prices due to the arrival of new infor-
mation is a necessary condition for information to have social value. Thus we need
to be careful when judging the welfare implications of such price changes. Chapter
1 documents that the Chilean authorities viewed the arrival of new information as
bad for the economy because it affected asset prices. Our analysis showed that a
Planner could take advantage of such a situation and improve welfare. However, our
result on ex-post improvements suggest that the authorities are right to be worried
if they are concerned with welfare from an ex-post point of view.
Our results provide new insights on the value of public information in exchange
economies where equilibria are not necessarily fully Pareto efficient. Gottardi and
Rahi (2014) show that with incomplete markets a Planner can obtain ex-post im-
provements for any initial information structure, by locally changing the information
agents receive before trading. In our setting, constrained ex-post improvements are
possible only under special circumstances: the uninformative equilibrium interest
rate needs to be above the equilibrium interest rate for every signal of the informa-
tive information structure. In the main result of the chapter we show that ex-ante
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improvements exist if the common prior is sufficiently close to the threshold divid-
ing first best equilibria from equilibria where the savings constraint and short-sale
constraint are binding. These ex-ante improvements are not marginal in nature. We
consider a situation where posteriors can be far away from the prior, in fact one of
the posteriors is equal to one.
Finally, we have shown that the study of the value of information in exchange
economies can be simplified by adopting the techniques used in the literature on
Bayesian persuasion. The simplification lies in realizing that information structures
can be defined as a vector of posteriors and a vector of probabilities of the posteriors
such that Bayes plausibility is satisfied. By taking the Planner as the sender and
the agents as the receivers, whose actions affect the Planner’s payoff by changing
equilibrium prices and the constrained feasible set, we can relate the value of infor-
mation to the concavity of the Planner’s utility function, the Pareto frontier. The
difference between our model and the standard problem in the Bayesian persuasion
literature is that on top of Bayes plausibility, the sender has to make sure that the
utility levels he assigns to the unconstrained agent, leave her indifferent with respect
to the uninformative equilibrium.
Our analysis used the condition that the total endowment is constant in every
period and state of the world. Possible extension of this work may be to relax this
assumption and see if our results extend to this more general setting. Also, in our
current model there is no reason why agents should face mandatory constraints,
therefore the best thing the Planner could do is to remove the mandatory savings
altogether. We plan to extend our model to the case of preferences involving hyper-
bolic discounting or temptation, where having mandatory savings constraints can
be optimal. Finally, we have been silent about the existence of ex-ante improvement
through marginal changes in posteriors, in future work we plan to relate this to
Radner and Stiglitz (1984).
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Appendix
2.A Proof of Proposition 1
To prove the existence of an equilibrium, instead of working with the financial
market equilibrium defined in Definition 1, it is easier to write the model in terms of
contingent consumption. For this, we define a non-arbitrage equilibrium following
Magill and Quinzii (2002). We then prove the equivalence between both types of
equilibria. First, let’s define alternative budget sets for both agents:
Bc(p, wc) =
{
xc ∈ R3+
∣∣∣∣∣
2∑
s=0
psx
c
s =
2∑
s=0
psw
c
s, x
c
s ≥ wcs + θs +
p0θ3
p1 + p2
∀s ∈ {1, 2}
}
,
Bu(p, wu) =
{
xu ∈ R3+
∣∣∣∣∣
2∑
s=0
psx
u
s =
2∑
s=0
psw
u
s
}
.
(2.6)
where p = (p0, p1, p2) is the vector of contingent consumption prices. Using the
budget sets in (2.6) we can now define a non-arbitrage equilibrium:
Definition 9. Given pi, a non-arbitrage equilibrium is a collection of prices p ∈ R3++
and consumption plans x = (xu, xc) ∈ R6+, such that:
1. xh ∈ argmax {V h(xh, pi) ∣∣xh ∈ Bh(p, wh)} ∀h ∈ {c, u},
2.
∑
h
(
xh − wh) = 0.
Having defined both type of equilibria, we can now prove their equivalence. First
we show the equivalence of both budget sets in the absence of arbitrage.
Lemma 1. Let q = (1, q1) ∈ R4++, and p = (1, p1) ∈ R3++. If q1 = p1Φ, then
Bh(q, wh) = Bh(p, wh) for all h.
Proof. Notice that the non-arbitrage condition q1 = p1Φ implies: q11 = p
1
1, q
1
2 = p
1
2,
and q13 = p
1
1 + p
1
2. Assume x
h ∈ Bh(q, wh) for all h, then:
xh0 − wh0 = −q1zh = −p1Φzh = −
∑
s
p1sΦsz
h, (2.7)
where Φs represents row s of matrix Φ. The budget constraint in period 1 implies:
xhs − whs = Φszh,
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thus we can rewrite (2.7) as:
xh0 − wh0 = −
∑
s
p1s(x
h
s − whs ). (2.8)
Furthermore as zcs ≥ θs for s = 1, 2, and q13zc3 ≥ θ3:
xcs = w
c
s + z
c
s + z
c
3 ≥ wcs + θcs +
θ3
q13
. (2.9)
Equations (2.8) and (2.9) imply that xh ∈ Bh(p, wh) for all h.
Assume now xh ∈ Bh(p, wh) for all h. Then xcs − wcs ≥ θs + θ3/(p11 + p12). Fix
zc3 = θ3/q
1
3. As q
1
3 = p
1
1 + p
1
2, there exist z
c
s ≥ θs for s = 1, 2, such that:
xcs − wcs = zcs + zc3 ≥ θs + θ3/q13.
Replacing xcs = w
c
s+z
c
s+z
c
3 into
∑2
s=0 psx
c
s =
∑2
s=0 psw
c
s we obtain x
c
0+
∑
k q
1
kz
c
k = w
c
0.
These two results imply that xc ∈ Bh(q, wh). For u the result follows from noticing
that she can freely choose the zu ∈ R3. Then for any xus − wus there exist zu ∈ R3
such that xus − wus = zus + zu3 .
From the equivalence between the two budget sets under the no arbitrage con-
dition, when can prove the equivalence between the two type of equilibria.
Lemma 2.
1. If (x, z, q) is a financial market equilibrium with q = (1, q1), then (x, p), with
p = (1, p1), and p1 satisfying q1 = p1Φ, is a non-arbitrage equilibrium.
2. If (x, p) is a non-arbitrage equilibrium with p = (1, p1), then there exist port-
folios zu and zc and asset prices q = p1Φ such that (x, z, (1, q)) is a financial
market equilibrium.
Proof.
1. By Lemma 1 xh ∈ argmax{V (xh, pi) ∣∣xh ∈ Bh(q, wh)} imply
xh ∈ argmax{V (xh, pi) ∣∣xh ∈ Bh(p, wh)} for all h. As ∑h zhl = 0 for l = 1, 2, 3,
then
∑
h(x
h
s − whs ) = 0 for s = 0, 1, 2.
2. By Lemma 1 xh ∈ argmax{V (xh, pi) ∣∣xh ∈ Bh(p, wh)} imply
xh ∈ argmax{V (xh, pi) ∣∣xh ∈ Bh(q, wh)} for all h. As ∑h(xhs − whs ) = 0 for
s = 0, 1, 2, then
∑
h z
h
l = 0 for l = 1, 2, 3.
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Using the equivalence between financial market equilibria and non-arbitrage equi-
libria, we can now prove the existence of a financial market equilibrium following
the standard proof involving contingent consumption.
Proof of Proposition 1:
We will prove the existence of a non-arbitrage equilibrium, and then invoke Lemma
2.
It is well-known that agent u’s optimal demand function for contingent consump-
tion is continuous, homogeneous of degree zero, satisfies Walras’ law, satisfies non-
negativity, and has the appropriate boundary behavior. The proof can be found, for
example, in Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988). Below we will argue that c’s demand
function has the same properties. Let’s start with continuity: As V (·) is continuous
in consumption, if we can show that c’s budget correspondence, defined in (2.6),
is compact-valued and continuous, continuity of c’s demand function follows from
the maximum theorem. That Bc(p, w) is compact-valued is direct when prices are
stictly positive. Let’s study its continuity.
Upper hemi continuity: Take a sequence (pn, wn) ∈ R4++ × R3+ converging to
(p, w) ∈ R4++×R3+. Let (xn) ∈ R3+ be a sequence such that (xn) ∈ Bc(pn, wn) ∀n. Our
assumptions on θl for l = 1, 2, 3, guarantee that the budget correspondence is never
the empty set. Clearly the sequence (xn) is bounded below by the zero vector. Let
p = maxs (supn ps,n) > 0, where s ∈ {0, 1, 2}; w∗ = maxs (supnws,n) > 0, and p =
mins (infn ps,n) > 0.
18 Then xs,n ≤ pw∗p for all s and n. Hence the sequence (xn) is
bounded, and by the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem it has a convergent subsequence:
xnk → x. Since xnk ∈ Bc(pnk , wnk):
∑2
s=0 ps,nkxs,nk ≤
∑2
s=0 ps,nkws,nk , and xs,nk ≥
ws,nk + θs +
p0,nkθ3
p1,nk+p2,nk
for s = 1, 2. Taking limits it’s direct to see that x ∈ Bc(p, w),
as weak inequalities hold at the limit.
Lower hemi continuity: Fix (p, w) ∈ R4++ × R3+. Let O be an open subset of R3+
such that Bc(p, w)∩O 6= ∅. Suppose Bc(p, w) is not lower hemi continuous at (p, w),
then for every n ∈ N there exist a (pn, wn) within a 1n -neighborhood of (p, w) such
that Bc(pn, wn) ∩ O = ∅. Take any x ∈ Bc(p, w) ∩ O such that x is in the interior
of Bc(p, w). Then λx ∈ Bc(p, w) ∩ O for λ ∈ (0, 1) sufficiently close to 1. But as
(pn, wn) converges to (p, w) and px − pw < 0 and xs > wxs + θs + p0θ3/(p1 + p2)
for s = 1, 2, continuity of λpnx − pnwn and xs − wxs − θs − p0θ3/(p1 + p2) implies
that λpnx − pnwn < 0, and xs > wcs,n + θs + p0,nθ3/(p1,n + p2,n), for s = 1, 2;
for n large enough. But then x ∈ Bc(pn, wn) for such n. This contradicts O and
Bc(pn, wn) being disjoint. Thus the budget correspondence is continuous, and we
obtain continuity of demand using the maximum theorem.
Walras’ law follows from strong monotonicity of preferences, and homogeneity of
18Let  be such that ps −  > 0, where ps is the limit of the convergent sequence (ps,n). Then
there exist N such that for all n ≥ N : ps +  > ps,n > ps −  > 0. Therefore ps,n > min{ps −
,min{ps,1, ..., ps,N−1}} > 0 for all n, as the sequence only takes strictly positive values. This
implies infn ps,n > 0. A similar argument gives us that w
∗ and p are strictly positive and do not
diverge to infinity.
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degree zero follows from the fact that the budget set does not change if we multiply
all prices by the same constant.
Define the excess demand function of agent h as:
φh(p) = xh(p, wh)− wh,
where xh(p, wh) is h’s Walrasian demand function. The aggregate excess demand
function of the economy is:
φ(p) =
∑
h
φh(p).
As xh(·) is continuous, homogeneous of degree zero and satisfy Walras’ law, these
properties are directly inherited by φ(p). As xh(·) ≥ 0, this implies there exist an
m > 0 such that φs(p) > −m for every s and all p. Finally we have to prove that if
pn → p, where p 6= 0 and ps = 0 for some s, then max {φ0(pn), φ1(pn), φ2(pn)} → ∞.
Suppose this is not true. Then the sequences max
{
φh0(p
n), φh1(p
n), φh2(p
n)
}
does not
diverge to infinity for any h, and so each of the φhs (p
n) for s = 0, 1, 2 does not diverge
to infinity for any h. Assume the value of c’s endowment is different from zero at the
limit. Then, there is a bounded set B ⊂ R3+ such that φc(pn) ∩ B 6= ∅ for infinitely
many n. Then the sequence (φc(pn)) ∈ B has a convergent subsequence. Let φc∗
be the limit of this subsequence, and define xc∗ = φc∗ + wc. Then xc∗ ∈ R3+ and
pxc∗ = pwc. Take any other xc ∈ R3+ such that pxc ≤ pwc. If pxc < pwc, then for
n large enough pnxc < pnwc. Let xcn = φ
c(pn) + wc, then xcn % xc. By continuity
of preferences: x∗c % xc. If pxc = pwc we can find a sequence (x̂cn) converging to xc
with px̂cn < pw
c, but then x∗c % x̂cn, and by continuity of preferences: x∗c % xc. But
this is a contradiction since by strong monotonicity the demand of c at p is not well
defined , because by consuming more of the good with price equal to zero, she can
increase her utility at no cost. If the value of c’s endowment at the limit is equal to
zero, then the result follows from doing the sames analysis for u as total endowment
w is assumed to be strictly positive.
As the excess demand function is defined for all strictly positive price vectors,
and satisfy all the properties explained above, existence of equilibrium follows from
Proposition 17.C.1 in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995). 
2.B Proof of Proposition 2
Let x = (xu, xc) be the competitive equilibrium allocation and normalize q0 = 1.
Assume x is not constrained Pareto optimal, then there exist a constrained feasible
allocation x and a supporting portfolio z such that V (xh, pi) ≥ V (xh, pi) for all h and,
say, V (xc, pi) > V (xc, pi). As x is feasible,
∑
h x
h
s −whs ≤ 0 for s = 1, 2. This implies
Φ
∑
h z
h ≤ 0. As equilibrium prices q satisfy no arbitrage:19 q∑h zh ≤ 0. Local non
19Otherwise the optimization problem of agent u has no solution.
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satiation of preferences imply that: xu0 +
∑3
s=1 qsz
u
s ≥ wu0 . Similarly, as V (xc, pi) >
V (xc, pi): xc0 +
∑3
s=1 qsz
c
s > w
c
0. Adding across consumers:
∑
h x
h
0 + q
∑
h z
h > w.
Thus
∑
h x
h
0 > w which contradicts constrained feasibility of x. 
2.C Proof of Proposition 3
If there exist an ex-ante Pareto improvement, then there exist an informative infor-
mation structure Ŷ , and a constrained feasible allocation under Ŷ , (x̂(y1), x̂(y2), x̂(y3))
with: ∑
k
pr(yk)V
u(x̂u(yk), pi(yk)) =
∑
k
pr(yk)V
u(xu(yk), pi(yk)),∑
k
pr(yk)V
c(x̂c(yk), pi(yk)) >
∑
k
pr(yk)V
c(xc(yk), pi(yk)).
(2.10)
where x is the uninformative equilibrium allocation. Set pik = pi(yk) and τk = pr(yk)
for k = 1, 2, 3, where pi(yk) and pr(yk) are the posteriors and signal probabilities
implied by Ŷ . Bayes’ rule imply that the posteriors under Ŷ , pi(yk) for all k have to
satisfy condition 1 in the proposition. Let Vk = V
u(x̂(yk), pi(yk)) for k = 1, 2, 3, then
condition 2 is also satisfied. The allocation (x̂c(y1), x̂
c(y2), x̂
c(y3)) satisfy all the
constraint in (2.4) when F is evaluated at (pi(y1), V1), (pi(y2), V2), and (pi(y3), V3)
respectively. Hence F (pi(yk), Vk) ≥ V c(x̂c(yk), pi(yk)), and using (2.10), condition
3 is satisfied, as the uninformative equilibrium is constrained Pareto efficient by
Proposition 2 and
∑
k pr(yk)V
c(xc(yk), pi(yk)) = V
c
0 = F (pi
0, V u0 ).
Assume there exist vectors (τ1, τ2, τ3) ∈ ∆2, (pi1, pi2, pi3) ∈ [0, 1]3 and a vec-
tor of utility levels (V1, V2, V3) ∈ R3 such that conditions 1, 2 and 3 are satis-
fied. Let x̂c(yk) be the argmax of the optimization problem defining F (pik, Vk), and
x̂u(yk) = w− x̂c(yk) for k = 1, 2, 3. Then (x̂(y1), x̂(y2), x̂(y3)) is constrained feasible.
Furthermore V u(x̂u(yk), pik) = Vk, and V
c(x̂c(yk), pik) = F (pik, Vk) for k = 1, 2, 3.
Then conditions 2, and 3 imply that the allocation (x̂(y1), x̂(y2), x̂(y3)) obtains an
ex-ante Pareto improvement over the uninformative equilibrium, as F (pi0, V u0 ) =
V c0 =
∑
k τkV
c(xc(yk), pik). 
2.D Proof of Corollary 4
We will start from the last part of the corollary. If F is concave, then
∑
k pr(yk)pi(yk) =
pi0 and
∑
k pr(yk)Vk = V
u
0 implies
∑
k pr(yk)F (pi(yk), Vk) ≤ F (pi0, V u0 ). Therefore we
cannot have an ex-ante improvement by Proposition 3. Next we need to show that
if there exist an ex-ante Pareto improvement, then cav F (pi0, V u0 ) is greater than
F (pi0, V u0 ). If F coincide with cav F at the point (pi
0, V u0 ), then when
∑
k pr(yk)pi(yk) =
pi0 and
∑
k pr(yk)Vk = V
u
0 we have
∑
k pr(yk)cav F (pi
k, Vk) ≤ cav F (pi0, V u0 ) =
F (pi0, V u0 ), as the concavification is concave. But by definition cav F (pi
k, Vk) ≥
F (pik, Vk) for all k, therefore
∑
k pr(yk)F (pi
k, Vk) ≤ F (pi0, V u0 ). Finally, assume the
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concavification of F is greater than F at (pi0, V u0 ). Carathe´odory’s theorem states
that if a point m of R3 lies in the convex hull of the graph of F , then m lies in a
2-simplex with vertices in the graph of F . As the concavification of F is the bound-
ary of the closure of the convex hull of F , cav F (pi0, V u0 ) belongs to the boundary
of a 2-simplex with vertices in the graph of F . Therefore (pi0, V u0 , cavF (pi
0, V u0 )) =∑3
k=1 αkmk, with
∑
k αk = 1, αk ≥ 0 for all k, and where mk = (pik, Vk, F (pik, Vk))
is a point in the graph of F for k = 1, 2, 3. As cav F (pi0, V u0 ) > F (pi
0, V u0 ), setting
pr(yk) = αk we obtain that
∑
k pr(yk)F (pi
k, Vk) > F (pi
0, V u0 ). 
2.E Proof of Proposition 5
We start with the first part of the proposition. Let’s work with the model in terms
of contingent consumption. Assume the equilibrium under pi is full Pareto efficient.
Full Pareto optimality in our economy is characterized by full consumption smooth-
ing, i.e. xh0 = x
h
s for s = 1, 2 for all h. From agents’ optimality conditions it is easy to
see that this allocation implies that equilibrium prices are (p0, p1, p2) = (1, pi, 1−pi),
and xc1 =
1
2
(wc0 + piw
c
1 + (1− pi)wc2). In equilibrium, as R(pi) = 1, we must have
xc1 ≥ wc1 + θ1 + θ3, hence:
1
2
(wc0 + piw
c
1 + (1− pi)wc2) ≥ wc1 + θ1 + θ3. (2.11)
Solving the inequality in (2.11) for pi we obtain:
pi ≥ 2θ3 + 2(θ1 + w
c
1)− wc0 − wc2
wc1 − wc2
= pi1. (2.12)
Assume now that pi ≥ pi1. From inequality (2.12) we can go back to (2.11) and
therefore the allocation xhs =
1
2
(
wh0 + piw
h
1 + (1− pi)wh2
)
for s = 0, 1, 2 and for all
h satisfy both lower bounds on c’s period 1 consumption, and jointly with prices
(p0, p1, p2) = (1, pi, 1 − pi) is the equilibrium when the posterior is pi. As there is
full smoothing across time and states of the world, the equilibrium is fully Pareto
efficient.
Now we prove the inverse of the second part of the proposition. First, notice
that in any equilibrium where c’s lower bound on state one consumption is not
binding, then the lower bound on state 2 consumption cannot be binding. As the
lower bound on xc2 is the smallest of the two lower bound, if it were binding, then c
could increase her utility by marginally reducing xc1 and increasing x
c
2 to bring both
consumptions closer together. Assume now that in equilibrium the lower bounds on
c’s state one consumption is not binding (and therefore the lower bound on xc2 is
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also not binding), then from the optimality conditions of both agents we have:
u′(xhs )
u′(xh0)
=
ps
pis
for s = 1, 2, ∀h. (2.13)
Equation (2.13) implies that the equilibrium allocation satisfies xh0 = x
h
1 = x
h
2 for
all h. We obtain full Pareto efficiency of the equilibrium. 
2.F Proof of Proposition 6
Assume, as a way of contradiction, that there exist x̂ and pi1 such that V (x̂h, pi1) ≥
V (xh, pi1) for all h and with strict inequality for some h. By convexity of CFS(R),
if there exist such Pareto improvement, then there exist a marginal improvement.
Let’s compute the directional derivative of V (xu, pi1):
DαV
u
0 = v
′(xu0)α0 + pi
1v′(xu1)α1 + (1− pi1)v′(xu2)α2, (2.14)
where xhs is h’s equilibrium consumption in state s in the uninformative equilibrium,
with period 0 denoted by s = 0. For u to be indifferent with respect to the uninfor-
mative equilibrium we need DαV
u
0 = 0. When u is indifferent we can solve equation
(2.14) for α0:
α0 =
− (pi1v′(xu1)α1 + (1− pi1)v′(xu2)α2)
v′(xu0)
. (2.15)
Computing the directional derivative for c, forcing changes in consumption to be
feasible, we obtain:
DαV
c
0 = −v′(xc0)α0 − pi1v′(xc1)α1 − (1− pi1)v′(xc2)α2. (2.16)
Feasible changes that leave u indifferent have to satisfy (2.15). Replacing (2.15) into
(2.16):
DαV
c
0 = −α1pi1v′(xu1)
(
v′(xc1)
v′(xu1)
− v
′(xc0)
v′(xu0)
)
− α2(1− pi1)v′(xu2)
(
v′(xc2)
v′(xu2)
− v
′(xc0)
v′(xu0)
)
.
If in the uninformative equilibrium all constrains are binding, then xh0 6= xh1 6= xh2 .
In particular we have xc1 > x
c
2 > x
c
0 and x
u
0 > x
u
2 > x
u
1 . As v
′ is decreasing:
v′(xcs)
v′(xus )
− v
′(xc0)
v′(xu0)
< 0 for s = 1, 2. (2.17)
Therefore, for c to be better off we need at least one αs > 0. This means increas-
ing u’s consumption in one of the states in period 1, or reducing c’s consumption.
But as both lower bounds are assumed to be binding, those changes are not con-
strained feasible. There is no constrained feasible allocations that attains a Pareto
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improvement.
If only the constraint on xc1 is binding in the uninformative equilibrium, then
xh0 = x
h
2 for all h, and x
c
1 > x
c
0. In this case equation (2.17) still holds for s = 1. For
s = 2 the expression is equal to zero. This implies that c is made better off if and
only if α1 > 0, i.e. if and only if u consumption in s = 1 is increased. This change is
not constrained feasible and we reach the same conclusion: there is no constrained
feasible allocations that attains a Pareto improvement. 
2.G Proof of Theorem 7
Assume without loss of generality that R(pi1) ≥ R(pi0). Then CFS(R(pi1)) ⊆
CFS(R(pi0)). By Proposition 6 there is no feasible allocation in CFS(R(pi0)), and so
in CFS(R(pi1)), that Pareto dominates the uninformative equilibrium when utility
is computed using pi1.
Assume that R(pik) < R(pi0) for k = 1, 2, 3. Let x be the uninformative equi-
librium allocation. As xh1 6= xh0 for all h, x is not in the Pareto set under any
posterior. This means that for pik there exist a different allocation, call it x̂, in
the Pareto set, i.e. such that V (x̂h, pik) ≥ V (xh, pik) for all h with strict inequal-
ity for some h. If x̂ ∈ CFS(R(pik)) for all k then the uninformative equilibrium is
not ex-post constrained Pareto efficient. If x̂ 6∈ CFS(R(pik)) for some k, consider
the allocation x˜ = λx + (1 − λ)x̂ with λ ∈ [0, 1]. For λ sufficiently close to one,
we can make x˜ ∈ CFS(R(pik)) and x˜ 6= x. Strict convexity of preferences tells us
that V (x˜h, pik) ≥ V (xh, pik) for all h with strict inequality for some h. Thus the
uninformative equilibrium is not ex-post constrained Pareto efficient. 
2.H Properties of the equilibrium gross interest
rate
Lemma 3. If (A2) is satisfied with equality, i.e. wc1 + θ1 = w
c
2 + θ2, then R is
increasing in (0, pi).
Proof. Assume wc1 + θ1 = w
c
2 + θ2 and pi ∈ (0, pi).20 Then when both constraints
are binding there is full consumption smoothing in period 1. This implies q1/q2 =
pi/(1 − pi), or R = pi/q1. From u’s FOC Rv′1 − v′0 = 0, where v′s ≡ v′(xus ). As both
constraints are binding xus = w
u
s−θs−θ3R for s = 1, 2; and xu0 = wu0 +θ3+q1θ1+q2θ2 =
wu0 + θ3 + (piθ1 + (1 − pi)θ2)R−1. Let φ(R, pi) ≡ Rv′1 − v′0, then using the implicit
function theorem:
R′ = −φpi
φR
=
v′′0(θ1 − θ2)R−1
v′1 +Rv
′′
1(−θ3)− v′′0
(
−(piθ1+(1−pi)θ2)
R2
) > 0, (2.18)
20it is easy to check that when wc1 + θ1 = w
c
2 + θ2, then pi2 = pi1.
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where the inequality follows from both the numerator and denominator in (2.18)
being positive. Assumption wc1 + θ1 = w
c
2 + θ2 implies θ1 − θ2 = wc2 − wc1 < 0. As
R > 0 and v′′ < 0, the numerator is positive. As θ3 > 0 and θs ≤ 0 for s = 1, 2; the
denominator is also positive.
It is straightforward to show that for all pi ≥ pi: R(pi) = 1. The following lemma
shows that for all other posteriors the gross interest rate is strictly less than one.
Lemma 4. If pi < pi, then q1 > pi, q2 ≥ 1− pi, and R(pi) < 1.
Proof. Under the assumptions of the lemma and given a vector of prices, u’s opti-
mization problem has a unique interior solution. Equilibrium prices follow from u’s
first order conditions, which are sufficient conditions for utility maximization under
the assumptions of the lemma. These can be written as:
q1 = pi
v′(xu1)
v′(xu0)
,
q2 = (1− pi)v
′(xu2)
v′(xu0)
.
(2.19)
When pi < pi, the first best allocation is not constrained feasible and so we need to
have: xc1 > x
c
0 and x
c
2 ≥ xc0. This is equivalent to: xu1 < xu0 and xu2 ≤ xu0 . As v′′ < 0,
from (2.19) we see that q1 > pi and q2 ≥ 1 − pi, and so q1 + q2 > 1. This implies
R = (q1 + q2)
−1 < 1.
When (A2) is satisfied with equality Lemma 3 gives us continuity of R. If (A2)
is satisfied with strict inequality the following lemma gives us continuity of R in an
interval around pi.
Lemma 5. There exist a neighborhood around pi such that the equilibrium gross
interest rate is a continuous function of pi.
Proof. If (A2) holds with equality the result follows from Lemma 3. Assume (A2)
holds with strict inequality and let’s work with the model in terms of contingent
consumption.
When pi = pi equilibrium prices are the solution to the system:
piv′ (xu1)− p1v′ (xu0) = 0,
(1− pi)v′ (xu2)− p2v′ (xu0) = 0.
When (A2) holds with strict inequality, the lower bound on xc1 is strictly above the
lower bound on xc2, thus: x
u
1 = w
u
1−θ1−θ3/(p1+p2), xu2 = xu0 = (wu0 + p2wu2 + p1(θ1 + θ3/(p1 + p2))) /(1+
p2) > w
u
2 − θ2 − θ3/(p1 + p2), where the last inequality follows from the fact that at
pi = pi, the equilibrium features full consumption smoothing.
The prices p1 and p2 are the endogenous variables, and pi is a parameter. This
system has a solution at pi = pi, given by p1 = pi and p2 = 1 − pi. If we can show
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that the determinant of the Jacobian of endogenous variables is not zero at pi = pi,
then the implicit function theorem will give us continuity of equilibrium prices, and
therefore continuity of the equilibrium gross interest rate, in a neighborhood of pi.
The Jacobian of endogenous variables is given by:(
piv′′1
∂xu1
∂p1
− v′o − p1v′′0 ∂x
u
0
∂p1
piv′′1
∂xu1
∂p2
− p1v′′0 ∂x
u
0
∂p2
(1− pi)v′′2 ∂x
u
2
∂p1
− p2v′′0 ∂x
u
0
∂p1
(1− pi)v′′2 ∂x
u
2
∂p2
− v′o − p2v′′0 ∂x
u
0
∂p2
)
, (2.20)
where v′s ≡ ∂u(x
u
s )
∂xus
. Evaluating (2.20) at pi = pi, where xu0 = x
u
1 = x
u
2 , q1 = pi and
q2 = (1− pi), it simplifies to:(
piv′′1
(
∂xu1
∂p1
− ∂xu0
∂p1
)
− v′o piv′′1
(
∂xu1
∂p2
− ∂xu0
∂p2
)
0 −v′o
)
, (2.21)
The determinant of (2.21) is given by:
− piv′′1v′0
(
∂xu1
∂p1
− ∂x
u
0
∂p1
)
+ (v′0)
2
> 0, (2.22)
where the sign of the expression in (2.22) follows from strict concavity of v, and
∂xu1
∂p1
− ∂xu0
∂p1
= θ3−θ1
2−pi > 0, as θ3 > 0 and θ1 ≤ 0.
Finally we show that (A4) implies that R is not differentiable at pi.
Lemma 6. If wu0 − wu2 6= −2(θ1 + θ3), then R is not differentiable at pi.
Proof. The right derivative of R at pi is equal to zero as R(pi) = 1 for all pi ≥ pi.
If (A2) is satisfied with equality, the result follows from Lemma 3. Otherwise, in a
interval around pi the equilibrium gross interest rate can be define as:
R(pi) =
{
RFB(pi), if pi > pi,
RB(pi), if pi ≤ pi.
where RFB is the interest rate under first best equilibrium prices, i.e. RFB(pi) = 1
for all pi. On the other hand, RB(pi) = (p1 +1−pi)−1, where p1 given by the solution
of u’s first order conditions when p2 = 1− pi and xu0 = xu2 .
This definition helps us see that R′−(pi) = R
′B(pi). Using the fact that RB(pi) = 1,
R′B(pi) = p′1(pi) − 1. Therefore we need to show that the first derivative of p1 with
respect to pi is different from one. At pi = pi equilibrium prices follow from the
system shown in the proof of Lemma 5. These prices feature p2 = 1− pi. Using the
implicit function theorem:
∂p1
∂pi
=
−
(
v′1 + piv
′′
1
∂xu1
∂pi
− p1v′′0 ∂x
u
0
∂pi
)
piv′′1
∂xu1
∂p1
− v′0 − p1v′′0 ∂x
u
0
∂p1
.
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In the limit v′0 = v
′
1, and it is easy to check that
∂xu1
∂pi
= −∂xu1
∂p1
. Therefore ∂p1/∂pi = 1
if and only if
∂xu0
∂pi
= −∂xu0
∂p1
. In equilibria where p2 = 1− pi and the constraint on xc1
is binding we have:
xu0 =
1
2− pi
(
wu0 + (1− pi)wu2 + p1
(
θ1 +
θ3
p1 + 1− pi
))
.
Taking derivatives with respect to p1 and pi:
∂xu0
∂p1
=
1
2− pi
(
θ1 +
θ3
p1 + 1− pi
)
− 1
2− pi
(
p1θ3
(p1 + 1− pi)2
)
,
∂xu0
∂pi
=
xu0
2− pi +
1
2− pi
(
−wu2 +
p1θ3
(p1 + 1− pi)2
)
.
So,
∂xu0
∂pi
= −∂xu0
∂p1
if and only if:
xu0 = w
u
2 − θ1 − θ3,
wu0 + (1− pi)wu2 + piθ1 + piθ3 = (2− pi)(wu2 − θ1 − θ3),
wu0 − wu2 = −2(θ1 + θ3).
2.I Proof of Proposition 9
Here we provide a proof for the case when (A2) is satisfied with strict inequality.
First we will argue that f and its argmax are continuous functions at pi.
Lemma 7. Fix pi0. Let pi be in the interval around pi where R is continuous and
assume f is defined at f(pi, pi0). The function f is continuous in pi. Let x∗ be the
argmax of f(pi, pi0), then x∗ is a continuous function of pi.
Proof. The function v is strictly increasing, this implies that the last constraint in
the definition of f in equation (2.5) will always bind at a solution. When that
equation holds with equality we can solve it for xc0 obtaining x
c
0 as a function of pi,
pi0 and xcs for s = 1, 2:
xc0 = g(x
c
1, x
c
2, pi, pi
0) ≡ w − v−1
(
V u(pi0)−
∑
s
pisv(w − xcs)
)
.
The function f coincides with the function f 1 defined as:
f 1(pi, pi0) =
{
Max
{xc1,xc2}
v(g(xc1, x
c
2, pi, pi
0)) +
∑
pisv(x
c
s)
s. t. xcs ≥ wcs + θs + θ3R(pi) for s = 1, 2
}
.
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We will argue that f 1 is continuous. Consider the correspondence:
Γ(pi) =
{
(xc1, x
c
2) ∈ [0, w]2 |xcs − wc1 − θ1 − θ3R(pi) ≥ 0 ∀s = 1, 2
}
,
Theorem 2.2. in chapter 7 in De la Fuente (2000) tells us that if the functions
defining Γ(pi) are continuous, concave in (xc1, x
c
2) for a given pi, if Γ(pi) is compact
and if there exist x̂ = (x̂1, x̂2) ∈ Γ(pi) such that x̂s−wc1− θ1− θ3R(pi) > 0 ∀s = 1, 2,
then Γ(pi) is continuous at pi. Clearly the functions defining Γ are continuous and
concave in consumption, and given a posterior the set Γ(pi) is compact. Assumption
(A3) implies wc1 + θ1 + θ3R(pi) < w, therefore the point x̂ = (w,w) satisfy both
conditions with strict inequality. Hence Γ(pi) is continuous in pi.
As the function v is continuous and strictly increasing, its inverse is continuous.
This gives us continuity of the objective function defining f 1. By Berge’s theorem of
the maximum the function f 1(pi, pi0) is continuous in pi and its argmax is nonempty
and upper hemicontinuous. As f 1 and f (and their argmax) are equivalent, we
obtain continuity of f and upper hemicontinuity of x∗.
Now we will argue that x∗ is single valued for a given pi, therefore obtaining
continuity of x∗. For this we work directly with f . The maximization problem in
f is characterized by a constraint set that is convex and a objective function that
is strictly concave in consumption for a given pi, therefore x∗ is the unique optimal
solution.
Proof of Proposition 9:
The derivative of f with respect to pi (where it exists) is given by:
∂f(pi, pi0)
∂pi
= v(x1)− v(x2)− θ3R′(pi)(λ1 +λ2) + v
′(x0)
v′(w − x0) (v(w − x1)− v(w − x2)) ,
where λ1 and λ2 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints on x
c
1
and xc2 respectively. For all posteriors strictly above pi, R
′(pi) = 0. At pi the right
derivative of R is equal to zero and the left derivative is non-negative. Solving the
maximization problem defining f we obtain:
λ1 =
v′(xc0)
v′(w − xc0)
piv′(w − xc1)− piv′(xc1),
a continuous function of pi. If both lower bounds on consumption are not bind-
ing, then λ1 = λ2 = 0, and it is straightforward to show that the Planner assigns
an allocation featuring full smoothing across time and states. At pi the CFS is a
proper subset of CFS(R(pi0)) (R(pi0) < 1). Therefore at pi we must have λ1 > 0,
otherwise the first best allocation is constrained feasible in the uninformative equi-
librium, violating constrained Pareto optimality of the uninformative equilibrium.
By continuity, for pi slightly below pi it is still true that λ1 > 0. If R
′
−(pi) 6= 0, where
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R′− denotes the left derivative of R, then we have:
v′−(pi, pi
0)− v′+(pi, pi0) = −θ3R′−(pi)(λ1 + λ2) < 0.
R′−(pi) is different from zero by Lemma 6. We want to show that there exist
 > 0 such that:
f(pi, pi0) < 0.5f(pi + , pi0) + 0.5f(pi − , pi0) (2.23)
Taking a first order Taylor approximation around pi we can write f(pi+) and f(pi−)
as:
f(pi + , pi0) = f(pi, pi0) + f ′+(pi, pi
0)+ o()
f(pi − , pi0) = f(pi, pi0)− f ′−(pi, pi0)+ o()
where o() represents the remainder. If (2.23) is not true then:
0 ≥ (f ′+(pi, pi0)− f ′−(pi, pi0)) + o()
0 ≥ (f ′+(pi, pi0)− f ′−(pi, pi0)) +
o()

(2.24)
When R′− 6= 0, f ′+(pi, pi0) − f ′−(pi, pi0) > 0. If the approximation error in the Taylor
approximation is non-negative, then (2.24) is a contradiction. If the approximation
error is negative, then as o()

tends to zero as  goes to zero, for  small enough we
can make the modulus of o()

smaller than f ′+(pi, pi
0)−f ′−(pi, pi0) and again we obtain
a contradiction. 
The next lemma provides a sufficient condition for f to be defined at (pi, pi0).
Lemma 8. There exist δ > 0 such that if pi0 ∈ (pi−δ, pi), then f is defined at (pi, pi0)
Proof. Let xus (pi) be u’s equilibrium allocation when the posterior is pi for s = 0, 1, 2.
When the posterior is equal to pi we have: xus (pi) = w
u
1 − θ1 − θ3 for s = 0, 1, 2, by
definition of pi. This allocation is constrained feasible by Proposition 1. Define xu
as:
xu(pi) = v−1 (V (xu(pi), pi)− v(xu1(pi))) ,
i.e. xu(pi) is the period 0 consumption that leaves u indifferent between the equilib-
rium under posterior pi, and consuming (xu(pi), xu1(pi), x
u
1(pi)). Clearly x
u(pi) = xu0(pi),
hence xu(pi) ∈ (0, w). If the equilibrium interest rate is continuous in pi, so it is each
component of the vector of equilibrium allocations. Therefore xu(pi) is continuous in
pi. This implies that there exist a δ such that for all pi ∈ (pi − δ, pi): xu(pi) ∈ (0, w).
Hence the set defined by the constraints in the definition of f is not empty for all
pi0 ∈ (pi − δ, pi). Continuity of R in an interval around pi is proved in Lemma 5 in
appendix 2.H.
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2.J Proof of Theorem 10
First we argue that if pi0 is close to pi then x(pi0) and x(pi0) are well defined.
Lemma 9. There exist a δ > 0 such that if pi0 ∈ (pi − δ, pi), then x(pi0) and x(pi0)
are in [0, w].
Proof. x(pi0) ∈ [0, w] follows from Lemma 8, as x(pi0) = w − xu(pi0). Define xu as:
xu(pi) = v−1
(
V (xu(pi), pi)
2
)
.
clearly xu(pi) = xus (pi) for s = 0, 1, 2, hence x(pi) ∈ (0, w). If the equilibrium
interest rate is continuous in pi, so it is each component of the vector of equilibrium
allocations. Therefore xu(pi) is continuous in pi. This implies that there exist a δ such
that for all pi ∈ (pi, pi−δ): xu(pi) ∈ (0, w). But then x(pi0) = w−xu(pi0) ∈ [0, w].
Now we will show that pi() is continuous and well defined around  = 0. For
simplicity let’s assume that pi0() = pi −  with  = [−γ, pi] and γ a small posi-
tive number such that pi + γ < 1. We do this to simplify notation and make pi0
differentiable at  = 0.
Lemma 10. Assume that (A2) holds with equality, or that (A2) holds with strict
inequality and (A4) holds (R′−(pi) 6= 0), then there exist a ̂ > 0 such that pi() is
continuous for all  ∈ [0, ̂).
Proof. We start with the case when (A2) holds with strict inequality. Let v−1 be
the inverse of v. By the inverse function theorem v−1 is continuously differentiable.
The posterior pi() is the pi that solves the following equation:
w − v−1
(
V u(pi0())
2
)
= wc1 + θ1 + θ3R(pi). (2.25)
At  = 0 the solution to (2.25) is pi = pi ∈ (0, 1). In appendix 2.H we argued that
for all pi ≤ pi0 the equilibrium gross interest rate is given by RB. We also showed
that RB is differentiable at pi, and its derivative is, by definition, equal to R′−(pi).
Therefore we can rewrite (2.25) as:
w − v−1
(
V u(pi0())
2
)
= wc1 + θ1 + θ3R
B(pi). (2.26)
As all the functions in (2.26) are continuously differentiable and RB
′
is different from
zero at  = 0 by (A4), the implicit function theorem gives us continuity of pi() in an
interval around  = 0. Continuity tells us that pi() ∈ (0, 1) for all  in an interval
around  = 0. When (A2) is satisfied with equality, monotonicity of RB allows us
to use the implicit function theorem and arrive at the same conclusions.
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Let’s define the function g(a, ) = aV ()+(1−a)V ()−V0(), mapping R× [0, pi]
into R. We next study the properties of g. Properties of g:
Notice that g(a, 0) = 0 for all a. When  = 0, then pi0 = pi = pi, therefore V (0) =
V0(0) = V (0). Next, we will show that the right derivative of g with respect to  at
(a, 0) is zero for all a.
Claim 1. lim→0+ g(a, ) = 0 for all a.
Proof. Taking the first derivative of g with respect to :
∂g(a, )
∂
= aV
′
() + (1− a)V ′()− V ′0().
Remember that the functions V (), V () and V0() are given by:
V () = 2v(x()),
V () = v(x()) + v(wc1 + θ1 + θ3),
V0() = v(x0()) +
∑
s
pi0sv(xs()).
(2.27)
where x0() is c’s uninformative equilibrium allocation in period 0 when prior is
pi0 = pi − , similarly xs() is c’s uninformative equilibrium allocation in state s.
Consumption levels x() and x() are defined by:
2v(w − x()) = v(w − x0()) +
∑
s
pi0s()v(w − xs()),
v(w − x()) + v(wu1 − θ1 − θ3) = v(w − x0()) +
∑
s
pi0s().v(w − xs())
(2.28)
Differentiating the functions defined in (2.27) with respect to :
V
′
() = 2v′(x())x′(),
V ′() = v′(x())x′(),
V ′0() = v
′(x0())x′0() +
∑
s
pi0sv
′(xs())x′s()− v(x1()) + v(x2()).
(2.29)
Using (2.28) we can get an expressions for x′() and x′():
−2v′(w − x())x′() =− v′(w − x0())x′0()−
∑
s
pi0sv
′(w − xs())x′s()+
v(w − x1())− v(w − x2()),
−v′(w − x())x′() =− v′(w − x0())x′0()−
∑
s
pi0sv
′(w − xs())x′s()+
v(w − x1())− v(w − x2()).
(2.30)
When  goes to 0+: x0 = x1 = x2 = x = x. Let φ(0
+) ≡ lim→0+ φ(). In the limit
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we can rewrite (2.30) as:
2x′(0+) = x′0(0
+) +
∑
s
pisx
′
s(0
+),
x′(0+) = x′0(0
+) +
∑
s
pisx
′
s(0
+).
(2.31)
Evaluating (2.29) at x0 = x1 = x2 = x = x and using (2.31) we have:
V
′
(0+) = V ′0(0
+) = V ′(0+).
Next, we show that g(1, 0) is a strict local minimum.
Claim 2. If lim→0+ (x′0()− x′1()) 6= 0 holds, then lim→0+ g(1, ) > 0.
Proof. Notice that g(1, ) = V
′′
()−V ′′0 (). Let us now compute the second deriva-
tives of V0, and V :
V ′′0 () =v
′′(x0())x′0()
2
+ v′(x0())x′′0() +
∑
s
pi0s
(
v′′(xs())x′s()
2
+ v′(xs())x′′s()
)
+
2
∑
s
(−1)sv′(xs())x′s(),
V
′′
() =2v′′(x())x′()2 + 2v′(x())x′′(),
where we have used the fact that the second derivative of pi0 with respect to  is
zero. The second derivative of x() has to satisfy:
2v′′(w − x())x′()2 − 2v′(w − x())x′′() = v′′(w − x0())x′0()2−
v′(w − x0())x′′0() +
∑
s
pi0s
(
v′′(w − xs())x′s()2 − v′(w − xs())x′′s()
)
+
2
∑
s
(−1)sv′(w − xs())x′s().
(2.32)
Now we can compute V
′′
(0+)− V ′′0 (0+):
V
′′
(0+)− V ′′0 (0+) =v′′(x0(0+))
(
2x′(0+)2 − x′0(0+)2 −
∑
s
pi0sx
′
s(0
+)
2
)
+
v′(x0(0+))
(
2x′′(0+)− x′′0(0+)−
∑
s
pi0sx
′′
s(0
+)
)
−
2v′(x0(0+))
∑
s
(−1)sx′s(0+).
(2.33)
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Using (2.32):
2x′′(0+)− x′′0(0+)−
∑
s
pi0sx
′′
s(0
+) =
v′′(w − x0(0+))
v′(w − x0(0+))
(
2x′(0+)2 − x′0(0+)2−
∑
s
pi0sx
′
s(0
+)
2
)
+ 2
∑
s
(−1)sx′s(0+).
(2.34)
Equations (2.33) and (2.34) imply:
V
′′−V ′′0 =
(
v′′(x0(0+) + v′(x0(0+))
v′′(w − x0(0+)
v′(w − x0(0+)
)(
2x′(0+)2 − x′0(0+)2 −
∑
s
pi0sx
′
s(0
+)
2
)
.
As v′′ < 0, g(1, 0+) > 0 if and only if 2x′(0+)
2 − x′0(0+)2 −
∑
s pi
0
sx
′
s(0
+)
2
< 0.
Assume (A2) is satisfied with strict inequality, then around pi we have x0 = x2, and
x′0 = x
′
2 (See appendix 2.H). Using (2.31) to replace x
′(0+):
x′0(0
+)
2
+
∑
s
pi0sx
′
s(0
+)
2 − 1
2
(
x′0(0
+) +
∑
s
pi0sx
′
s(0
+)
)2
> 0,
(2− pi)x′0(0+)2 + pix′1(0+)2 −
1
2
(
(2− pi)x′0(0+) + pix′1(0+)
)2
> 0,
(2− pi)pix′0(0+)2 + (2− pi)pix′1(0+)2 − 2(2− pi)pix′0(0+)x′1(0+) > 0,
x′0(0
+)
2
+ x′1(0
+)
2 − 2x′0(0+)x′1(0+) > 0,(
x′0(0
+)− x′1(0+)
)2
> 0.
(2.35)
If (A2) is satisfied with equality instead, then we have x1 = x2 and x
′
1 = x
′
2, and
the same conclusion follows.
Now we characterize when is it that condition lim→0+ (x′0()− x′1()) 6= 0 holds.
Claim 3. lim→0+ (x′0()− x′1()) = 0 if and only if R′−(pi) = 0.
Proof. In an interval around pi equilibrium prices are such that p2 = 1 − pi and R
follows from u’s F.O.C:
Rv′1 − v′0 = 0,
where v′s = ∂u(x
u
s )/∂x
u
s . Differentiating this F.O.C. with respect to  and taking
the limit as  approaches 0+:
−R′−(pi)v′1 + v′′1x′1(0+)− v′′0x′0(0+) = 0,
−v′0R′−(pi) + v′′0(x′1(0+)− x′0(0+)) = 0.
Therefore x′1(0
+) = x′0(0
+) if and only if R′−(pi) = 0.
From Claim 3 we see that (A2) being satisfied with equality, or assumption (A4)
are sufficient conditions for g to attain a strict local minimum at (1, 0). This gives
us the following lemma:
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Lemma 11. If (A2) is satisfied with equality, or if (A4) holds, then lim→0+ τ̂ =
(1− τ3)a < 1− τ3
Proof. The second derivative of g with respect to : g = aV
′′
() + (1− a)V ′′()−
V ′′0 () is continuous in a. As g(1, 0) > 0, continuity in a implies that there exist
a < 1 such that g(a, 0) > 0. Using claims 1 and 2, g(a, ), as a function of , attains
a strict local minimum at (a, 0) with g(a, 0) = 0. Therefore on a neighborhood of
 = 0, g(a, ) > 0 for all . Thus aV () + (1 − a)V () − V0() > 0 for all  in the
interval. Solving for a:
1 > a >
V0()− V ()
V ()− V () ∀ ∈ [0, ). (2.36)
But (2.36) implies that the limit of τ̂ /(1− τ3) as  tends to 0 is strictly lower than
one, giving us the result in the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 10:
Set µ < (1− τ3)1−a2 , where a = lim→0 τ̂ /(1− τ3) < 1. For this µ there exist a δ̂ such
that for all  ∈ [0, δ̂), |τ̂ − a(1 − τ3)|< µ. Similarly, for this µ there exist a δ˜ such
that for all  ∈ [0, δ˜), |τ˜ − (1− τ3)|< µ. Set δ = min{δ̂, δ˜}, then for all  ∈ [0, δ) we
have:
a(1− τ3)− µ < τ̂ < a(1− τ3) + µ,
(1− τ3)− µ < τ˜ < (1− τ3) + µ.
(2.37)
Equation (2.37) imply that for all such , τ̂ < τ˜ as a(1− τ3) + µ < (1− τ3)− µ. 
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